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1996 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

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
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1996 National Drug Control Strategy...

HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT  
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

MAY 8, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight



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
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# 1996 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

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WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1996

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William H. Zeff, Jr., (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Zeff, Mica, Souder, Thurman, and Cummings.

Staff present: Judy McCoy, chief clerk, and Jane Cobb, professional staff member, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; Robert B. Charles, staff director and chief counsel; Sally Dionne, clerk; Robert J. Shea, and Sean Littlefield, professional staff members.

Mr. ZEFF. Good afternoon. Welcome, General McCaffrey. The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will now come to order.

I want to thank everybody for coming. I want to particularly welcome Gen. Barry McCaffrey, the newly confirmed White House Drug Czar and Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

As I've said elsewhere, I congratulate the President for probably one of the most outstanding selections that he has made, and that is of you, General McCaffrey. I think he has made an excellent choice.

We are honored to have the general with us. We have enormous respect for him and for all that he has accomplished at SOUTHCOM and Desert Storm and in Vietnam.

Having met several times privately with the general, I know that he is someone who brings new hope to this issue, and I am proud to work with him. Together I hope we can reverse the alarming rise in drug use since 1992 and drug-related violent juvenile crime.

Already the Republican leadership and I personally have worked to get you the staff that you have requested, since this office was cut by the President back in 1992—or 1993, I should say, from 150 down to 25.

Our hearing topic this afternoon, as most know, is the President's 1996 White House Drug Control Strategy, which was released last week.

Ben Gilman, chairman of the International Affairs Committee, assessed the latest strategy, and I hope he's wrong as, and I quote,



"Old wine in new bottles." So far I think that the statement is correct. I hope that as we move forward we can change that analogy.

Speaking openly, I think there are many Republicans and Democrats in Congress who expect a change. Drug use by kids has been getting worse since 1992, not better, and juvenile crime is rising fast, too.

These facts cannot be ignored. This is an issue that concerns us all and calls for a complete rethinking of our national commitment to the war on drugs.

We need a strategy that will work not just in an election year but for all time, 1997, 1998, the year 2000 and beyond. If we can put a man on the moon, we certainly can win the war on drugs.

Looking back over the past 3 years, I think the President's priorities have proven to be misplaced. He has systematically reduced the Nation's narcotics effort on interdiction and source country programs, driving down street prices and driving up street purity and availability.

At the same time, instead of making prevention and education the cornerstone of the strategy, the President has favored treatment programs with, I think, a weak track record.

The results of this strategy are now in. We have a major policy failure, and I think it's time that we bring the wall down and move forward.

Now, regardless of party, we have to get this thing back on track. We have to help each other recommit the Nation to the concept that we will win the drug war, get the priorities right and fund them adequately. But we need a plan.

Some of us just visited the brave American men and women on the front lines in the drug war, DEA agents and young Coast Guard officers struggling against narco-traffickers in the transit zone and source countries of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.

We saw what they're up against. We saw what they were doing with meager resources. We saw how brave they were in this fight.

We saw them fighting powerful, well-organized and violent narco-trafficking cartels on a shoestring budget. We admire you, General McCaffrey, and we hope that you can help turn things around. These brave men and women deserve better than they are now getting, and we all need to commit to that.

In Manchester, NH, I have gone to the site, and so has Mrs. Thurman, a site of drive-by drug shootings. The link between Colombia and Manchester is closer than many realize.

Many people would like to think that the drugs grown in South America never hit their streets, but they do hit our streets, and there is a direct correlation.

The numbers are clear and worth reviewing. In 1992, President Bush committed \$1.5 billion to drug interdiction. In 1993, President Clinton cut \$200 million out of the interdiction effort.

He mothballed aircraft, removed intelligence assets, and reduced a number of cutters' ship days, flying hours, and personnel. We detailed all of this in our annual report.

But let me continue. In 1994, he cut interdiction again by another \$18 million. In 1995, the President's budget request for drug interdiction fell yet another \$15 million.



And now, in the latest drug strategy, released last month, the President has put drug interdiction down at a level still \$100 million below the 1992 level.

Let me turn to the source country programs where we stop the drugs in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia before they get to our shores.

Here the President stripped President Bush's \$523 million commitment down to \$329 million in his first year in office. That's a 37 percent cut in 1 year.

Then, in 1995, the commitment dropped again, to \$309 million, a cut of \$20 million.

Now, this year, 1996, international moneys, according to the plan that we received last week, is still \$123 million below the 1992 level. That is one reason that many of us are very concerned.

On the demand reduction side, let me just say this: When President Clinton announced his latest drug strategy, he spoke about being committed to prevention, but if the President were really committed to prevention and education, that portion of his budget, while we increased much of the treatment portion of the budget, we would think that there would be major increases there.

What has happened here, is that the treatment portion continues to be supported at record high levels. The sad truth is that the President still seems to think that treating the wounded is the best way to win the war.

So instead of redistributing the treatment moneys back into prevention and education programs that keep kids off drugs, he's added another \$129 million to Federal drug treatment.

That piece of the effort is now at a whopping all-time high of \$2.9 billion, way above prevention, education, interdiction, or source country programs and I believe way out of line with what the Nation's anti-drug priorities ought to be.

Instead, we still use the flawed Rand study that omitted prevention altogether to defend a strategy that doesn't work. The truth is that even the best treatment programs are only 10 to 25 percent effective, and that means that we lose between 7 and 10 kids tomorrow for every 1 that we save today.

In my view, that is the wrong priority, and I know that you will work with us to get the President and all of us and the drug policy back on track.

We cannot afford to stand by while juvenile drug use and juvenile crime skyrocket. Even the Justice Department has made the point that drug-related violent crime will double by the year 2010 if we do not turn it back now.

General, we need your help, and I look forward to your ideas and your suggestions. I particularly look forward to a strategy that moves us over a 10-year period to winning the war on drugs, and I know you'll address that.

I know you need help from our side of the aisle. I think the biggest thing that we need to do is, at some point, we've got to stop talking about the failed policies of the past and we've got to start talking about the changes that you are going to recommend.

We need a plan. We need a strategy. We need quantifiable goals, and we need to be able to set that in motion by giving you the kind of tools that you need to put that plan in action. So I'm looking forward to your testimony today, sir.

With that, I'd like to turn the mike over to Karen Thurman. You might want to introduce our new colleague from Maryland.

Mrs. THURMAN. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you.

Mrs. THURMAN. And then I will reserve the time for myself to make an opening statement as well.

Mr. ZELIFF. Sure.

Mrs. THURMAN. Today we're very privileged and lucky to have Elijah Cummings, who is the new—and this is his first committee meeting, and he is now going to get a real taste of what it's like to be in Congress with committee meetings going on.

Mr. Cummings comes from Baltimore. I happened to have a nice conversation with him yesterday afternoon to welcome him to this committee.

He gave me a little bit of his background, of the fact that he had served 14 years in the House of Representatives and speaker pro tem, I understand.

He comes from the city of Baltimore, where he certainly understands and appreciates this issue from a very personal level and from a community level.

My guess is during his tenure within the State legislature that there were lots of things that were going on, and I hope that he brings us a perspective of good relationships between our communities, our State, and our Federal Government, because I believe, as all of us do, that it takes all of us to make a difference in this campaign.

So Mr. Cummings, we welcome you, and if you'd like to say anything, I'd like to give you that opportunity and yield some time for you now.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, it certainly is a pleasure to be here. I'm really looking forward to working with you, and I thank you for the opportunity.

I think you will find a lot of my personal experiences, especially with regard to this subject; I live in a drug-infested area. I see it every day, and so I have some concerns, and I'm just glad that this is my first hearing.

Mrs. THURMAN. We're glad you're here. And if you'll let me proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ZELIFF. Sure.

Mrs. THURMAN. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am very pleased to see Gen. Barry McCaffrey here today. Above and beyond all the other things that Mr. Chairman said, I know that all of us on both sides have great admiration for you and have pledged their support to you. So let me add my praise for your selection and my support.

As we all know, there is no silver bullet to solving the drug problem in America. I have heard General McCaffrey use this phrase before, and I believe it bears constant repeating.

There are no easy or quick solutions. The hard fact is that it is going to require a lengthy and a massive cooperative effort among elected officials, parents, teachers, community leaders, and our children to end the deadly drug problem facing our Nation.

Also, General, I have also heard you say that calling this as a drug war is not necessarily a good description. In fact, you have re-

ferred to the drug problem in America as more similar to a cancer, an insidious disease that can be prevented, treated and attacked at the sources that cause the cancer.

I think that this is an excellent characterization. While there are no easy solutions, the problem is further compounded by election year politics. We need to remember that drugs have no political affiliation.

Have there been problems with past drug strategies? Yes, under both Democratic and Republican administrations. Do the President and the Congress need to do more? I believe so. We need to further address prevention, treatment, interdiction and eradication.

Even though drugs continue to threaten our children, there are some positive signs. As the 1996 strategy points out, tremendous progress has been made since the 1970's thanks in a large part to the strong bipartisan efforts of the Congress and three successive administrations.

The number of new cocaine users fell from 1.5 million in 1980 to about a half a million in 1992. Overall, cocaine use has fallen 30 percent over the last 3 years.

Drug-related homicides have fallen approximately 25 percent. Since the late 1980's, the United States has seized almost \$700 million a year from drug traffickers; however, there is still a great deal of work ahead of us.

In 1993, Americans spent almost \$50 billion on illegal drugs. Federal, State and local governments spend about \$30 billion a year in efforts to reduce drug use and trafficking and deal with the consequences.

Perhaps the most telling number is the fact that the annual social cost of illegal drug use is a staggering \$67 billion, resulting mostly from drug-related crime.

With so much work ahead of us, President Clinton acted decisively to appoint General McCaffrey upon the retirement of his previous Director, Dr. Lee Brown.

In addition, the President's fiscal year 1997 budget requested \$15.63 billion to fight drugs, the largest request by any President.

President Clinton is going to increase the staffing levels of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to 150 full-time employees.

In addition, the administration has used the certification process as a means to compel other nations to fight the drug problem within their own borders before it reaches the United States.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to refocus where our priorities should be. I regularly receive letters from students on the issues of the day, including the drug problem.

Let me share with you some of their comments. I believe everyone will note that we haven't yet lost an entire generation to drugs.

Mary McNamara of Powell Middle School in Brooksville, FL, wrote, "I strongly feel that drug abuse is a major problem in the United States today. The use of drugs in teenagers is increasing. Teenagers are using these drugs and receiving them from adults.

"Some of the problems caused by doing drugs are getting lower grades in school, also not carrying about what happens to you."

Mary's classmate, Ryan Munsey, told me that "Marijuana is the drug I'm concerned about. Kids are always talking about getting



weed or dope or the stuff. It's a shame. I'm only 13, but I know what goes on.

"The government may have to spare a few more dollars, but at least it will keep our kids safe and away from trouble."

And Chad Cancross says, "I think drugs are becoming way out of hand. I think we should crack down on it. It's bad in schools and the streets."

Mr. Chairman, I'm very pleased by these letters and other letters I receive that address the problem of steroid abuse by our children.

Young people know what is going on around them, and they want us to take action. General McCaffrey, I stand ready to provide any assistance to you and the chairman of the subcommittee, my friend, Bill Zeliff, because it is only by working together in a non-partisan manner that we will get a handle on this situation and make real progress in finding a solution to our Nation's drug problem.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you, Mrs. Thurman. In view of the fact that we have a pending vote, I'm sorry to do this to you, but I think you know the drill. I'm going to recess until approximately a quarter of, if that's OK, and we'll be back.

Again, I think you can see that we have a total bipartisan commitment to this program, that it's ours to solve together as a community and not just you alone.

We very much appreciate your willingness to take on this assignment. I think it's a tough one. I don't think anybody has a tougher job in Government, unless maybe the President, but you have our respect and best wishes. We'll be back at a quarter of.

[Recess.]

Mr. ZELIFF. The subcommittee investigating drug strategy will now come to order. Our policy is usually to swear in witnesses, if you would, General, please.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. ZELIFF. Let the record show that the answer was in the affirmative. If you would like to proceed, I know you have a commitment at 3:45 p.m. We're going to try to do everything we can to accommodate that.

#### **STATEMENT OF BARRY R. MCCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG POLICY CONTROL**

General MCCAFFREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, with your permission, I would ask to submit for the record my opening statement, written statement, which I earlier submitted to your colleagues.

Mr. ZELIFF. So ordered.

General MCCAFFREY. Let me begin, if I may, by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues for granting me the opportunity to come over here and lay out some of our thinking and to talk about the 1997 budget, and more specifically, to outline the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy.

There is no question, having listened to you and Representative Thurman, I understand you share the same objective. So I will listen very carefully to your views.

I understand your own personal long-term commitment against illicit drug use, and if I may, let me underscore the belief of many of us who have worked on the interdiction problem over the last several years that I found it enormously helpful to note the work of Codel-Hastert, which went to Mexico, Panama and the Andean countries.

I have read your Codel report, and I find it is on the mark and, in many ways, extremely helpful to our own thinking.

We do not have enough involvement on the part of the United States political authorities in Latin America, enough understanding of its vital importance, not just in drugs, but more importantly, in democracy political context and economic interaction.

So if I may, sir, let me congratulate you for that trip and for the report that came out of it.

I have also taken into account, as we developed our own national drug control strategy, the views of many people around the country and certainly the congressional leadership, Senator Hatch and Biden, in particular, and you and Congressman Rangel.

But if I may also add that we have reviewed carefully and taken into account "National Drug Policy, A Review of the Status of the Drug War, the Seventh Report, 1996."

And I thank you for this effort, and we found much of it enormously helpful to our own thinking.

If I may also note that we have read carefully and reviewed the report by Majority Leader Bob Dole and Speaker Newt Gingrich, "A Report by the Task Force on National Drug Policy: Setting the Course of National Drug Strategy."

I found this very helpful, and this also became part of our thinking as we went about the work of writing this document.

Finally, if you will, let me at least note for the record, and I commend it to your own analysis, a Gallup Organization poll that we had done in January and February entitled, "Consult with America: A Look At How Americans View the Country's Drug Problem." I think it's an excellent piece of work. It's enormously useful in providing insight into what the American people view as the dimensions of the problem, and as usual, I personally find it enormously encouraging and that it underscores the fundamental good sense of the American people.

The result of our deliberations, sir, was to table in Miami, I guess last Monday, this document entitled, "The National Drug Control Strategy, 1996."

We chose Miami and also a school setting for a lot of reasons. There is a lot to be learned out of South Florida. They were almost, like many American metropolitan areas, almost overwhelmed by the drug epidemic over the last decade. They organized themselves, and a lot of very sound thinking came out of that period, drug courts, the coalition that they established in Miami to bring together the private community business, education, religious leaders.

So they've really done a splendid job of preparing themselves to affect the problem. They've dropped drug use, we think, by about half in Miami in the last 7 or 8 years.

The second reason we wanted to go to a school was to underscore what many of us believe is the priority problem facing America, which is the defense of America's children.

It's clear that drug use among young people has gone up significantly in the last several years. Most of our data indicates that it has doubled in use.

Perhaps even more frightening, we find that children are using drugs earlier and earlier in many cases; that the sixth grade seems to be the initiation in illegal drug use.

Let me, if I may, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues for another matter, which is support of the ONDCP Budget Supplemental by \$3.4 million.

I tabled to you and your colleagues a design of a fairly lean organization of 154 people that I thought, based on my experience managing people and ideas and money, would give us a chance to respond to the Federal law which I am charged with upholding.

The funds you passed in the supplemental in the 1997 budget I think will allow us to better respond to congressional responsibilities that you've given me.

If I may, let me begin my testimony, though, by offering two things for your consideration. The first is a poster that should be in front of each one of you, with a 13-year-old girl named Wendy.

This is part of the work of this wonderful man Jim Burke and A Partnership for a Drug-Free America. He and his colleagues, very few of them, there are about 29 of them working up in New York, for the last several years have gotten more than \$1 billion in free advertising work out of the American advertising industry and then put it on the air. They've been a splendid part of our effort to educate young Americans and the Nation on the dangers of this problem, and I just commend that poster to you.

In addition, I would like to, with your permission, show a 4-minute video that I think makes the case most explicitly for what your committee and I are trying to accomplish in partnership.

So with your permission, sir, I will show a very short video.

Mr. ZELIFF. Without exception, so ordered.

[Video shown.]

General McCaffrey. I thought the videos really underscore in the most graphic way imaginable what, in my judgment, has been happening in America.

There are enormous successes going on. Clearly, overall drug use since the 1970's has come down from probably 22 million or above down in the range of somewhere between 11 and 12 million Americans who are regular drug users.

Some aspects of the drug challenge have improved enormously. Cocaine use has come down, perhaps, 75 percent in the last decade.

In the last few years, 2, 3, 4 years, we believe cocaine use has come down more than 30 percent. So there is room for optimism in that we are aware America can make the case successfully that drug use is an enormous threat to our national survival.

We lost 100,000 dead and \$300 billion during the decade of the 1990's. Now, having said that and even notwithstanding the fact that the money spent on drugs by Americans has come down from close to \$70 billion a year down into the \$50 billion range, we understand we still face some enormous problems.



The vast majority of Americans, I should again underscore, do not use drugs and strongly disapprove of substance abuse. We find that in the Gallup poll.

We also understand, however, that one-half of the baby-boomer parents smoke marijuana. More than 80 percent don't condone it now.

The figure, however, that causes concern is less than 50 percent of parents have talked to their children in a serious way about drug use.

Now, if I may, Mr. Chairman, turning to the strategy itself and how one could characterize it, first of all, it seems to me we have tabled what I have entitled a systems approach to underscore that we have five goals, that there is no single goal that will give us a jiu-jitsu solution on the drug problem.

If there is any one goal that is a priority, clearly it's our focus on youth. Kids are our No. 1 worry. There are 39 million children age 10 and under, the greatest number in this age group since the early 1960's.

We are aware that if that age cohort can reach 20 years of age without having smoked cigarettes, abused alcohol or used illegal drugs that they are highly unlikely to ever have a substance abuse problem in the remainder of their lives.

So if there is a priority, it's the 39 million kids that are the future of America.

I might also add that this is a bulge of young people; teens aged 14 to 17 will increase 23 percent in the next 10 years, and that is clearly our at-risk cohort.

Now, there is a difficult aspect to this issue, too. There is no one in his right mind who wouldn't understand that crack cocaine, alcohol abuse, inhalants, methamphetamines are not singularly destructive of young people.

But we might add that marijuana appears without question to be a gateway drug to later addictive problems. We are aware that there is a mathematical relationship here that doesn't necessarily imply a causal relationship.

But if you are a 12-year-old youngster who smokes marijuana, you have a 79 times greater chance of ending up with a serious addictive problem in life that those kids age 12 who don't.

So we clearly include both cigarettes and alcohol and marijuana as gateway drugs which are predictive of very high risks later on in life.

Now, if I may continue to outline the problem, the problem is not just the social cost of the dead and billions spent on crime.

If you look at the drug problem and track any sub-aspect of America, drugs become a dominant variable. AIDS cases, probably a third of it is caused by intravenous drug use or promiscuity based on crack cocaine.

Somewhere between 350,000 and 600,000 infants are exposed to one or more illicit drugs each year, many of them suffering, of course, significant damage in the process.

We have over 1 million people in this country arrested each year on drug-related charges. Much of this revolves around a number somewhere between 2.7 million and 3.1 million hard core drug users.



They comprise the group that consumes two-thirds of the tonnage of illegal drugs used in America. In addition, some two-thirds of them, the overwhelming majority, are in some way involved in the criminal justice system in a given year. They're either under arrest, awaiting trial, in prison or somewhere in the probation or parole system.

So if I may assert, part of this strategy is based clearly on a premise that if you don't like crime, then you will be an advocate of sound, responsible treatment programs and drug prevention.

We do know that treatment works in many cases. Some two-thirds of those so affected have been benefited by treatment where it's properly provided.

Now, a lot of the numbers are suspect, and one thing, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest is that I owe you and your colleagues next year some better accounting on how money goes against these goals and to what payoff.

But let me, if I may, still offer some numbers that underscore the value of these prevention programs. I've been all over the country now looking at models at work, and one of the models in Miami called ASPIRA, an at-risk youth program which, essentially, takes a 12-hour school day and tries to give young people structure and opportunity. Their own view is that \$2,000 per child ends up in saving, if you save one kid from turning into a drug addict, \$2 million—a tremendous investment in the future of America.

This drug strategy suggests five goals. It suggests a system, and it also suggests time. This problem is not one that lends itself to a short campaign of 1, 2 or 3 years.

It seems to me we owe America a 10-year commitment to confronting in a principled way all aspects of the drug problem.

If I may also offer the thought that it is clear that the payoff, while in some areas may be disproportionate, is that you can't neglect any single aspect of the system.

Look at what we've put in the 1997 budget, the interdiction programs which in the past have intercepted a third of the cocaine before it hits our streets. We argue and join your own thinking, sir, that a strong interdiction program is vital.

I am not convinced that interdiction necessarily changes the street value of drugs. It's impossible to keep drugs out of prison. There is no reason to think we can keep drugs out of America.

But I am persuaded that taking a couple of hundred metric tons of cocaine out of the hands of the international criminal cartels does pay off.

So you will find in our 1997 budget Operation Gateway, a United States Customs program in the Caribbean which we think, along with Customs, DEA and Coast Guard, will pay off enormous initiatives.

We have a Southwest border plan involving Customs, INS, DEA and others which we believe will significantly increase our ability to cooperate with Mexican legal authorities to stop the some 70 percent of drugs that comes across the 2,000-mile common border.

One of the other things I should underscore is our commitment to strong domestic law enforcement. Many in America properly bemoan the million or so Americans who are now in State and local prisons, with over 100,000 in Federal prison systems, and some

argue as many as a half million on any given day in city and county jails.

We will not arrest our way out of the drug problem, and of those who are incarcerated, at least a third and perhaps some police officers say as many as two-thirds are in some way related to the horrendous impact of drugs.

Having said that, we also understand you can't have effective treatment and prevention programs without valid law enforcement programs. We've got to ask the country's police officers to uphold the law.

But the budget does have in there a 9.3 percent increase for law enforcement. It includes more than 2,420 beds increased in the Bureau of Prisons, and it includes support for putting more than 34,000 new police officers on the street.

There is also an 8.7 percent increase in demand reduction, safe and drug-free schools and substance abuse, prevention and treatment performance partnership.

In interdiction, Mr. Chairman, an area that I know you have tremendous interest in, there is a 7.3 percent increase, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. Customs border initiative will have more than a 25 percent budget increase over the estimated 1996 level.

Finally, the international programs, which I believe have a potentially great payoff, although they are a very small percentage of our total budget, will be increased by 25.4 percent if you support this fiscal year 1997 budget.

And that will go to programs of support, source nation counter-narcotics activity such as the ones you just reviewed during your trips into Bolivia and Peru.

In closing, if I may suggest, there are three main efforts that we will be able to support. One is we've got to focus on the array of programs which will assist in safeguarding young people.

That has got to be America's first priority, and I would ask for your support and guidance in that area. Second, we've got to go to those programs which can be demonstrated to effectively reduce crime, violence and the horrendous cost of drug use on America.

We know that the 2.7 million chronic addicts, some of whom you just saw on television here, in videos, commit over 170 crimes a year.

So if they are just locked up or just left free on their own recognition without drug treatment programs, they will go right back to preying on America, and preying on America does not just mean stealing money to buy drugs.

It also means the \$20 billion a year impact on our health system. It means child abuse, spouse abuse. It means teenage pregnancies. It means a whole array of other social problems that you've got to also focus on, it seems to us, as part of an overall strategy.

We think the biggest challenge facing all of us who are responsible public leaders really is one of pessimism. I have suggested to you, sir, privately before, and I will publicly now, that one of our challenges is to explain to American leadership that this is not a hopeless problem.

There are a lot of problems that are very difficult to even understand the nature of the phenomena you're trying to address—pov-

erty, racism, AIDS, trying to understand how America moves from an industrial society to an information-based society—but the drug challenge to America does lend itself, many of us believe, to getting organized and to committing ourselves to a 10-year effort.

It lends itself to hard work, and many aspects of American challenges don't, but we have persuaded ourselves in many cases that it's really impossible to influence either supply or demand, that treatment is impossible, that education is a function of kids listening to rap music, not to their parents, coaches, religious leaders and teachers, which we argue is actually the case.

So many American leaders have really given up on it and suggest that they're going through the motions, and it's only as a matter of principle.

I don't share that vision, and I know you don't, either, nor many others. We have a lot of examples of where successful efforts are ongoing.

One of the joys of this job is to travel around the country and to find out about the literally hundreds of thousands of Americans who are involved in those programs already, the Pride organization, DARE program, TASK, ASPIRA.

Everywhere I go in America I'm seeing people who are already engaged. It darn sure didn't start with my appointment.

I'm telling those groups that I intend to act as their servant in this matter and create a partnership with Congress.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and your colleagues for the opportunity to come make this statement, and I look forward to answering your own questions.

[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY R. MCCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL  
DRUG POLICY CONTROL

"Drugs kill neighborhoods. People live in fear of violence. Children cannot play in the parks or on the streets. Stores close down. Buildings are neglected or abandoned. The sense of community disappears, leaving the streets in the hands of drug dealers and their customers."

—Drugs: Fighting Back!

Felice Kirby, Alex Kopelman, and Michael Clark

# 1. INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to be here today to respond to your questions, listen to your views, and outline the *1996 National Drug Control Strategy*.

Let me begin by thanking the members of this Committee and your colleagues for your principled, long-term commitment against illicit drugs and drug use. While many challenges remain before us, much has been accomplished through the bipartisan efforts of the Congress and three successive administrations. The *1996 National Drug Control Strategy* has meaning only when it supports the broad-based efforts of citizens and communities throughout the United States. Thank you for allowing ONDCP time to refine the national strategy and make it into a plan of action for which we can be held accountable.

A special word of thanks for your support for the FY 1996 ONDCP \$3.4 million budget supplemental. This will allow us to move forward quickly, but prudently to rebuild ONDCP by October 1, 1996 and fulfill the enormous responsibilities required by Federal law.

I understand that the purpose of this hearing today is to outline the *1996 National Drug Control Strategy*. We will present the strategy's goals, highlight some of the key programs that support these goals, and summarize how the FY 1997 National Drug Control budget will enable strategy implementation.



## 2. THE NATIONAL DRUG CHALLENGE

### The Drug Challenge to America: Reducing Drug Use and Its Consequences

- Drug use is unacceptably high.
  - \* 12M Americans used illegal drugs last year, down from 22M in 1985
  - \* Teen tolerance for drugs is up. Their use of the gateway drug marijuana is up dramatically in the past 4 years:
    - 8th Grade - up 167%
    - 10th Grade - up 81%
    - 12th Grade - up 46%
  - \* Addiction experts predict that about 820,000 of this new group of marijuana smokers will eventually try cocaine.
- The number of hardcore users is holding steadily at about 3M.
- The cost of drug abuse and trafficking is enormous.
  - \* 100,000 dead and \$300B in the 1990s alone.
  - \* 500,000 emergency room cases each year.
  - \* 250,000 Americans are serving time for drug law violations.
  - \* Drug use is involved in at least a third of all homicides, assaults, and property crimes.

The last 60 days have been a total immersion education on the drug challenges in America. Drug abuse and crime directly affects the lives of millions—not just inner-city residents or particular ethnic minority groups. These issues are at the forefront of the minds of all Americans. They fear the crime and violence that surrounds drug markets. They abhor the effect it has on their lives and on the lives of their children, and are especially concerned about the increase of drug use by our nation's young people. Drug use and its consequences are devastating to our society.

## 3. THE 1996 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

The 1996 *National Drug Control Strategy* provides a balanced approach to addressing the concerns of the American people. It organizes the national counterdrug effort by providing general guidance and specific direction to the more than 50 Federal agencies involved in the struggle against illegal drugs and substance abuse. It offers a framework to State and local government agencies, to educators and health care professionals, to law enforcement officials and community groups, and to religious organizations, mass media and to business. It is a catalyst for collective action to focus our actions, sustain our commitment, and help us achieve our national purpose.

## 4. NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY GOALS

### The 1996 National Drug Strategy Goals

- \* Motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse.
- \* Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
- \* Reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use.
- \* Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
- \* Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

This strategy sets forth five strategic goals. They ensure that our message is unambiguous, and that our purpose is clear. These goals:

\* Call for strengthening domestic law enforcement efforts as the key to taking drugs off our streets and reducing drug-related crime and violence.

\* Place a high priority on reducing the human and economic costs related to drug use by providing effective treatment.

\* Reinforce the need to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat and to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply to keep drugs off America's streets and out of the hands of our young people.

\* Provide a long-term (10 year), comprehensive, coordinated systems-based approach. There are no simple solutions or silver bullets to reduce drug use or the damage it causes.

Goal #1: Motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse.

"... if you take drugs, they're going to mess up your whole life. You're going to wind up saying to yourself 'why did I do this? Why did I make such a bad choice?'"

—Chris Mays, 4th Grade, Cedar Hill, Texas

Drug use among youth is on the rise after several years of decline. Past month use of all drugs among youth aged 12 to 17 increased by 50 percent between 1992 and 1994. Marijuana use almost doubled. Concurrent with the upsurge in youth drug use is a steady deterioration of the perceived risk and damage caused by drug

abuse. Approximately 39 million Americans are currently under age 10, the greatest number in this age group since the 1960s. If drug abuse occurs within this group at the same rate as it does today, drug use will increase by alarming proportions within the next 10 years.

We are making gradual progress towards our goal. The White House Leadership Conference on Youth, Drug Use, and Violence in March 1996 launched a national media literacy and drug deglamorization campaign aimed at youth. A Federal marijuana prevention initiative is resulting in the distribution of booklets, fact sheets, and audio/video products to help educate young people and their parents. The National Drunk and Drugged Driving Awareness Campaign complements this initiative. We have also encouraged States to adopt a "zero tolerance" standard for drivers under age 21 who use drugs or alcohol and drive. In the months ahead, ONDCP will work with advertising agencies, the news media, and the entertainment industry to craft a credible anti-drug message for our young people to maintain the momentum generated by these and other initiatives.

Goal #2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug related crime and violence.

Americans Are Concerned About Drug Abuse and Drug-Engendered Violence

- Teens view drugs as the most important problem they face. (CASA 1995 National Survey)
- Americans top two concerns are *violent crime* and *drug abuse*. (1995 Gallup Poll)
- U.S. Police Chiefs believe reducing drug abuse is the best way to reduce violent crime. (1995 Death Penalty Information Center)

Over one million Americans are arrested on drug-related charges each year. Despite the fact that only one in four people who use drugs is a hard-core user, this minority consumes the majority of the illegal drugs and commits the majority of drug-related crimes. About two-thirds of these hard-core users come in contact with the criminal justice system every year. Of more than 20,000 adult, male arrestees tested in 1994 under the Drug Use Forecasting program, 66 percent tested positive for use of at least one drug at the time of arrest. That is why the President's drug court program and criminal justice drug testing initiative will be so important.


Our national leadership and Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies have responded through a broad range of initiatives. The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program has already produced funding for an additional 34,000 police officers for America's streets and neighborhoods. The Drug Enforcement Agency's Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program resulted in more than 1,500 arrests of violent and predatory drug criminals in more than 50 communities throughout the nation. Finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Safe Streets Violent Crimes Initiative ensures better focused enforcement and investigative efforts against violent gangs, crimes, and fugitives. Nationally, homicides have decreased by 5 percent. Those judged to be drug-related are down approximately 25 percent.

Goal #3: Reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use.

Between 1990 and 1995, drug abuse cost our nation more than 100,000 dead. Drug-related social costs are estimated at \$67 billion each year. About 70 percent of this cost is directly related to crime. U.S. health care costs are growing steadily. In 1994, there were over 500,000 drug-related hospital emergencies. Intravenous drug users comprise about one-third of AIDs cases. Our newborns are particularly vulnerable—about 350,000 to 625,000 infants are exposed to one or more illicit drugs each year.

Despite remaining challenges, progress is being made. The Federal Drug Free Workplace Program has been remarkably effective in providing a safer, more productive environment for our nation's workforce. Three of four companies with 250 employees or more have formal anti-drug programs and policies currently in place. The criminal justice and drug treatment systems are systematically linked through a "Breaking the Cycle" program that provides accurate case management and treatment services for drug-dependent offenders. The shortfall of available drug treatment services remains significant. However, the percentage of those who required and subsequently received treatment increased from 38 percent in 1990 to 52 percent in 1994. Additionally, the number of individuals in treatment programs has increased steadily since 1980.

⇒ **Goal #4:** Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.



#### The Heroin Challenge: Preventing Another Epidemic

- Global cultivation of opium has doubled in the past ten years.
  - \* More than 4,000 metric tons were cultivated in 1995.
  - \* 60% of the world's heroin comes from Burma.
  - \* Colombia grew no opium prior to 1990. It grew 65 metric tons last year.
- ONDCP's "Pulse Check" survey indicates that while domestic demand for heroin is low, use of opium is increasing.
  - \* U.S. annual demand is about 13 metric tons.
  - \* Lower prices and increased purity will cause demand to increase.
  - \* Alternative modes of ingestion reduce barriers to usage.
  - \* We've forgotten what we learned about heroin in the 1970s.
- We can't afford to be surprised by another drug epidemic.

The vast majority of illicit drugs consumed in the United States are produced in other countries. Drug traffickers have reacted to our law enforcement success against the air bridge in the Eastern Caribbean by shifting the movement of drugs through Mexico. As much as 70 percent of all cocaine coming into the United States enters somewhere along our 2,000 mile Southwest Border with Mexico. The availability of heroin in our country is on the rise. The heroin industry is more decentralized, more diversified, and more resistant to law enforcement operations than cocaine. While domestic demand for heroin is low, increased availability and the drastic increase in purity on the street are leading to a rise in consumption, even among adolescents.

We are creating international alliances, partnerships, and cooperative agreements to meet these growing challenges. Our interdiction efforts in South America have disrupted the trafficking patterns of cocaine traffickers in Peru, causing them to change flight routes and modes of transportation. A third of the cocaine produced in the region is intercepted before it hits our streets and those of other countries. Information sharing with allied nations has resulted in interdictions including multi-ton cocaine shipments. Six of seven ringleaders of the Cali Cartel were arrested in 1995, one was killed by the Colombian police while resisting arrest. Key Asian countries have begun to arrest heroin kingpins and extradite them to the United States. Finally, we are working with the Government of Mexico towards improved counterdrug cooperation.

#### Goal #5: Break foreign and domestic sources of supply.

We must reduce the availability of drugs by reducing cultivation and production, and by destroying the trafficking organizations responsible for the distribution of drugs in the United States. Additional efforts must be made to identify and attack

the criminal groups and individuals that supply marijuana to young people, both internationally and domestically.

### 5. FY 1997 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS

The President's Federal Drug Control Budget request for FY 1997 is \$15.1 billion. This represents an increase of \$1.3 billion over the enacted FY 1996 level of \$13.8 billion—a 9.3 percent total increase.

#### Federal Drug Control Budget

[Millions]

	FY 96 (Estimated)	FY 97 (Requested)
Interdiction .....	1,339.4	1,437.2
International .....	319.5	400.5
Investigations .....	1,824.8	2,024
Prosecutions .....	910.3	1,000.9
Corrections .....	2,299.6	2,607.7
Intelligence .....	340.4	375.9
State & Local .....	1,734.2	1,775.2
Reg & Comp .....	45.1	98.1
Other Law Enf .....	291	284.6
R&D .....	569.6	559.2
Prevention .....	1,430.1	1,591.6
Treatment .....	2,679.4	2,908.7

FY 96: \$13.783 billion

FY 97: \$15.063 billion (proposed) (+ 9.3%)

The drug control budget is grouped into four major functional areas:

- Domestic Law Enforcement:

FY 1996 (Estimated)	FY 1997 (Request)	Difference (\$)	Difference (%)
\$7.6 billion .....	\$8.3 billion	+ \$703 million	+ 9.3%

Major enhancements include: expansion of activities such as DEA's Domestic Enforcement operations and the FBI's Organized Criminal Enterprises program; an increase of Bureau of Prison bedspace capacity by 2,420 beds; and support of the Community Oriented Policing Services (COP) program goal of 100,000 new police officers by the year 2000.

- Demand Reduction:

FY 1996 (Estimated)	FY 1997 (Request)	Difference (\$)	Difference (%)
\$4.6 billion .....	\$5.0 billion	+ \$399 million	+ 8.7%

Major enhancements include: expansion of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities program; expansion of the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Performance Partnership; and more robust treatment and rehabilitative programs for those in prison, jail, in juvenile detention, or on probation or parole.

- Interdiction:

FY 1996 (Estimated)	FY 1997 (Request)	Difference (\$)	Difference (%)
\$1.3 billion .....	\$1.4 billion	+ \$98 million	+ 7.3%

Major enhancements include expanded enforcement operations along the Southwest Border including the U.S. Customs Border Initiative (25% budget increase over the estimated FY 1996 level), and the Immigration and Naturalization Services' Southwest Border Initiative. The U.S. Customs "Operation Gateway" program expands operations into the Caribbean.

- International:

FY 1996 (Estimated)	FY 1997 (Request)	Difference (\$)	Difference (%)
\$320 million .....	\$401 million	+ \$81 million	+ 25.4%



Major enhancements include: expanded source nation counternarcotic activities to better address drug production, trafficking, and money laundering; improved international controls of precursor and essential chemicals; and programs that promote democratic institutions and assist with police training and criminal justice improvements.

## 6. CONCLUSION

The national drug problem will not be solved overnight. Our task is to break the cycle of addiction so that we can significantly reduce both illicit drug use and its consequences. We must demonstrate to the American people that we can successfully address the drug challenge. At stake are: trust in our public institutions; the security of our neighborhoods; the health and safety of our schools and work environments; and the future of our young people. There is every reason to believe that the American people—with our enormous spiritual and moral strength, our respect for law, and our compassion for our children can control the menace of drug abuse and the criminality it engenders.

The 1996 *National Drug Control Strategy* sets the stage for a long-term planning commitment to marshal the resources needed for effective drug programs. Future national drug control strategies will be modified in response to emerging drug trends and related developments. Our goals and objectives require strategic planning to ensure that resources are brought to bear against the drug problem in the most efficient way.

The President's instructions to me were to help create a cooperative, bipartisan partnership with Congress and the Federal, State, and local governments to achieve our purpose. ONDCP cannot do this alone. Your support, oversight, wisdom, and friendship will be enormously welcome as those of us privileged to be involved in meeting the drug challenge in America face up to this task.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you very much, General. I want to introduce Denny Hastert in a second, but before I do I'd like to ask you the same question I asked you on Meet the Press.

If President Kennedy in 1960 made a commitment to put a man on the moon, will President Clinton, through your efforts, make a commitment to win the war on drugs?

General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Chairman, in my own view, the President of the United States and the Vice President and their senior officers of Government are absolutely committed to this matter. There is no question in my mind.

They're parents. They're grandparents. They are absolutely fundamentally committed to making this work out. So again, I don't see this as a 1-year program.

Mr. ZELIFF. Right. It's a 10-year program, as you indicated earlier. It's a long-term quest, challenge, one to which we all have to make the same commitment.

But obviously, as we make that commitment, we have to follow through with a plan that gets those results. One of the things that we have a problem with here is getting the funding.

The \$250 million that was talked about when you were sworn in when I was at the White House, the request, the paperwork came over the same day that the omnibus bill was in the Rules Committee.

So unfortunately, the two paths never connected, and I'm concerned that we have a catch-up problem, and we're looking at 1997 budgets now.

Clearly, they are in process, and we need a strategy from you. We can't wait until 1998. So as we go through the questioning here, what we're going to try to do is figure out the plan that was released in Miami, is that what we're working from? Because if it is, then how do you respond to Ben Gilman's comment, "Old wine in new bottles"? Because I think you're looking at coming together

with a new strategy with new goals, quantifiable goals, things that we can measure, and I'm not sure that that is prepared yet.

So how do we pull all that together? I'm openly asking the question. While you're thinking about that, let me just have Dennis Hastert introduced. Denny is from Illinois, and he is the leadership's point person on helping us get all the resources you need.

He, along with myself, headed up our trip to South America. Mr. Hastert, would you have any comments you'd like to make? And then maybe, General, you can answer the question after you've had a chance to hear from Denny.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, General, it's good to see you here and actually ready to go. You don't have the four stars on today, but I know that you're in charge of this operation.

That's what we're looking for. We're looking for results, and we're looking to get things done. You've laid out very well the problems that are before us, the frustrations that are before this country.

Certainly, the results that we see, AIDS patients, kids in jails, crime, violence, the 3,000 crack cocaine babies that we have in this country every year that are a direct result of that, health system costs, people in emergency rooms and in hospitals that are there just because of drugs and warehousing those people who have literally burnt out through the system, and they're going to be walking bodies in this for some time and are never going to be able to make a decision for themselves again or be able to do anything without being told to do it.

We know what the cost to this country is. So there is two sides to the issue. We understand that the supply side is a part of it. The demand side is a part of it.

We're looking forward to hearing you tell us what you need. We know that about \$15 billion is going to be spent on demand side, probably about a tenth of that on supply.

But where do you need the resources? What is your plan? What do you need where? We need to have that so that we can start to implement this war on drugs.

I probably disagree a little bit with your first analysis in here. Yeah, we've had a drop in drug use in this country since 1980, but we see in every chart that's out there since 1992 it has started to go up again at all levels but especially kids, young kids.

And you're right on the button. We need to take care of that. We need to see what your plan is so that we can start to help you implement it.

Mr. ZELIFF. General, with that, maybe you might want to address the question in terms of how do we catch up with your plan as we are asked to support and commit to increased funding.

In other words, what we don't want to do is take a look at an old plan that we already feel is not doing the job. We want to see what you recommend and your wish lists or your list of individual items in prevention, education, treatment, interdiction and source country programs.

But we need to somehow get up to speed so that we can get over the hump and give it to you now. We can't wait until 1998, but we can't get the commitment here without the plan.

So it's a tough challenge. How would you respond to that?

General McCaffrey. Well, I would certainly underscore and join your own belief that the \$250 million supplemental for 1996 money is key to getting going on this issue now.

The day I was sworn in the President charged me with developing a line of thinking on how we could best bring to bear \$250 million of defense dollars on the issue.

We worked at it for 3 weeks. And I think you're quite correct. It got over here pretty late in that 1996 process, toward the end of the year, but it's still on the table, and I would still ask for your support.

There are some sound programs in there on interdiction, on source country operations. We have two major ongoing initiatives, one in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, that Admiral Bob Kramek and George Weise and Tom Constantine are all focused on.

It's barely off the ground, but we must shut the back door to drugs coming in the United States through Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

We've got a magnificent Governor, Governor Rossello, who I've worked with for the last couple of years, but we need your support, sir, on that project.

We've also got ongoing right now Operation Laser Strike in Latin America, and that \$250 million supplemental includes a burst of money to support that up tempo.

It also includes rebuilding two P-3s. We have a tremendous strain on Department of Defense AWACS assets, as you know. We're watching North Korea, watching the Gulf region, and trying to manage the Bosnia peacekeeping force.

So those two P-3s will provide a tremendous boost to our interdiction capabilities in Latin America. The bottom line, sir, is the \$250 million budget supplemental is still needed, and if there is a way to get that on the table, I would encourage you to do so.

The second suggestion I would make is that this fiscal year 1997 budget, I believe, in large measure, is sound. There are dramatic increases.

There is a battalion-sized increase in INS Border Patrol capability in this budget. There is a battalion-sized increase in the whole Customs area.

There is a 25 percent increase in the 2,000-mile Southwest Border Initiative. There is almost a 25 percent increase in source country operations.

So I think it's a pretty sound piece of work in general. It's also a 9 percent increase, and I'm always apprehensive about sudden major increases or decreases in funding and make sure we absorb them and use them in a prudent manner.

As you look at the budget, there is an 11.3 percent increase in there for drug prevention. That is clearly targeted at children, and there is inadequate money in it, but that's what we've put in as the increase.

There is about an 8.6 percent increase in drug treatment. I will be honored to explain to your committee and also to Congressman Lightfoot next year how effective I think those funds have been and to try and develop some sensible measures of accountability to report back to you on how we employed that money.

When you look at the 1997 budget, you're still looking at a 9.6 percent increase in the criminal justice system. Until we get out ahead of this problem with drug education, prevention, and treatment, we're going to build more prisons as the biggest growth industry in America.

I think the drug interdiction effort can help. It is vitally important, but we can't back away from that. So that, sir, is what I'd suggest, but I'd certainly be willing to hear carefully your own ideas on the subject.

Mr. ZELIFF. I just have one quick question, and then I want to pass it on to Mrs. Thurman. As I look at the numbers that you just discussed, we're still below where we should be and we're adding more into treatment up to \$2.9 billion.

Admittedly, that's an 8.6 percent increase, but the increases we have on interdiction and source country are on such a small base that it doesn't still amount to much.

In interdiction, it's \$100 million off of the successful effort in 1992, and it's about \$123 million off the source country programs.

Having just gotten back there, having gone out in the interdiction zone, the transit zones, talking with people on the front lines, the bases are small in comparison, but a small increase on top of a small base doesn't give you many dollars.

That is my concern. And again, more money on treatment. I applaud you on going back and giving us some kind of results, but this has been the problem up-to-date.

We throw money at programs with no idea of whether they're going to be successful or not, and this is a challenge as well.

I think our key here, however, is that we've got to somehow come together with your "systems approach" to come up with a plan with some quantifiable goals so that we can release that as quickly as we can, and then we can get the resources committed to it. Mrs. Thurman.

Mrs. THURMAN. In that vein, General, you just came back from Mexico. Would you like to give us maybe a little report on what happened? And then I have some other questions I'd also like to ask.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, indeed, Secretary Christopher led a United States delegation on Monday and Tuesday to Mexico. It was the biggest of our 13 in a row now of annual bi-national commissions.

Attorney General Reno and I co-chaired for the American side the Committee on Legal Affairs in Narcotics. Our opposite numbers were Attorney General Lozano and Deputy Attorney General Estrada from Mexico. We were also joined by Foreign Minister Gurilla.

If I may add, I made personal calls on Minister of Defense Cervantes and had an opportunity to discuss with and visit drug education programs in Mexico City.

It's impossible to not feel encouraged by the progress. Mexico has just passed a comprehensive money laundering bundle of laws.

They're working on and hope to have passed by next fall a package of laws dealing with organized crime. There are several initiatives in training and in technical support, and in intelligence ex-



change, which we have now entered into with the Mexican Government.

We have formed three bi-national border task forces. Attorney General Reno and I will go on to chair a border summit in El Paso on 20 June.

We will gather all the U.S. authorities and try to better understand how we can have a coherent 2,000-mile border plan for the U.S. side.

We have invited our Mexican counterparts to meet us here in Washington on 29 June, and there we'll try and again make an achievable concrete result every time we meet.

So this isn't going to be done in a night. There is \$20 billion of money at stake here. The Mexican army has destroyed more illegal drugs than any other nation on the face of the earth last year, and they did it at a cost of their own blood and sweat.

And we've asked Congress to support some modest but very important assistance for them in training, helicopters, helicopter repair parts, up tempo funds.

So we think we're off to a good start. I'll just come back here periodically and try and update you and seek your own advice on where we should go in the future.

Mrs. THURMAN. General, in your remarks earlier, you had mentioned the report that had been written by the committee.

In that report, there were several recommendations from the committee for improving or at least their idea of improving the Nation's drug policy.

Could you give us some ideas of what the administration has already done to meet some of these recommendations?

General MCCAFFREY. I probably owe you a more detailed response. I read the Clinger report and also the Dole-Gingrich paper personally.

I think the most areas of agreement are in the conclusions. It's sort of an odd thing. Many of us come to a common view of what ought to be done and perhaps have different viewpoints as to why it's the right thing to do.

There is also, I understand, a tremendous disconnect on the credibility of treatment and education programs. I think what we need, probably, are scientific studies that we can all agree are sound.

We're supporting the work of Mr. Joe Califano in the Columbia University Center for Drug Abuse. He's got a pretty decent piece of work with a couple of hundred treatment programs and 3,000 clients in which we'll try and get numbers that you and I can agree fairly represent the effectiveness of treatment programs.

The bottom line is I would suggest to you there is a surprising amount of agreement on conclusions but a lot of disagreement on the data.

Mrs. THURMAN. The report recommends that the President should work with the Congress to fund drug programs at levels that place the overall drug problem at the center of national policy considerations.

Can you please elaborate on the administration's budget request to reach that goal or those goals?

General McCAFFREY. Well, as you suggest, the 1997 budget does represent an attempt to close with a renewed commitment in several of these areas.

It's more money. It's substantially more money in some areas. It probably is not adequately resourced. I think this is a lean budget request. There is no question.

Could more money be used on international and interdiction programs? There is no question. I think Congressman Zeliff is quite right. These are fairly small denominators, but all in all, it provides us with a growth that we think is manageable, and it goes after the five goals that I've outlined in the national strategy.

Mrs. THURMAN. General, we thank you. And I know it's a tough time when there is balanced budgets being talked about and constraints on everybody's budgets, not only yours, but we look forward to hearing more of your reports.

I don't know if we're going to have another opportunity to do another round or whatever, but if we do, we'll get an opportunity to talk with you again.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you, Mrs. Thurman. Another courageous fighter in the drug war for the last few years and, I guess, going back to almost 15 years is John Mica from Florida. Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. General, you said you helped on the President's trip to Miami when he announced the new policy. Is that correct?

General McCAFFREY. I said I what?

Mr. MICA. Helped on the Miami trip?

General McCAFFREY. Indeed. Yes.

Mr. MICA. Did you work with a fellow by the name of Mort Engleberg?

General McCAFFREY. Indeed.

Mr. MICA. You did. Well, I don't want to be critical to start out with, but we're still reeling from the visit. I guess Mr. Engleberg rejected a black student from the public schools, Carver Middle Schools, or a Hispanic student, and they chose a white student that ended up coming from a private school.

It became a big controversy down there, and unfortunately, some of the message was lost. I'm just a little bit concerned about the start there. It just left some of south Florida in turmoil about this situation.

Some of it has calmed down. We want the attention. If it takes a Hollywood producer to do it, so be it, but it was sort of a rough start, at least in south Florida.

One of the people that I understand came with you was Janet Reno?

General McCAFFREY. One of the people that what, sir?

Mr. MICA. That came to Miami with the President.

General McCAFFREY. Both Attorney General Reno and Secretary Rubin and I, among others, came.

Mr. MICA. Now, one of my concerns is that prosecutions are down 12 percent in the last 2 years, drug prosecutions at the Federal level.

I didn't see a specific element or pronouncement that prosecutions are a priority or that we needed additional resources in that area. What's the status of prosecutions?

General McCaffrey. Well, if I can respond to your question, the last question, the criminal justice system budget increases by 9.6 percent.

So there is a quite substantial bill in there for prison construction. I share your viewpoint that you can't have effective drug education and prevention without strong law enforcement.

If I could respond to your initial concerns, I think all of us were sad to see the reaction to what was a tactical mistake on how the student was selected to introduce the President.

If you will allow me, let me strongly underscore a concern I personally have. It's important for America to understand that this problem is not a minority problem.

It's not Hispanics or African-Americans. It's all our problem. Seventy percent of the people who use drugs are employed. The great majority are white, not minority.

So I think what we properly want to do, all of us, is to remind ourselves that these are all of our children, not a problem that you and I and others can walk away from.

Mr. MICA. I'm very much aware of that. As you know, when I came back from the drug trip, I may have relayed—I did to the other Members—the first thing I did was call my wife.

And she told me very sadly that a young 19-year-old down the street from us who had drug problems had been in these treatment programs that are a failure, that we're spending more and more money on, committed suicide in front of his parents while I was gone.

That's the third young person that I personally know of that has faced this, and these are in affluent neighborhoods. They're not minority students or individuals.

Probably one reason crime is starting to show some reductions is we've built so damn many prisons, and they're packed with minorities and other folks.

I mean, we've incarcerated, as you've said, over 1 million folks in the United States.

I have another question here. I don't mind giving you the resources. This side is committed. You've got the leadership here. We'll give you any resources you need.

What assurance do we have, for example—and this is before you—some resources where they ended up in Bosnia, they ended up in Haiti missions and other things, moving the resources around for some other agenda items.

If we give you these funds, are they going to stay in the program?

General McCaffrey. Well, Mr. Congressman, I hear your point. I think that you should hold us accountable and require me to explain how we expend these funds.

I think you're right on the money. There ought to be some payoff in prudent use of American taxpayers' dollars. So I couldn't agree with you more.

Mr. MICA. Should we hold, final question, the President accountable for reprogramming over \$40 million? I guess it went out of one fund that was directed toward some of these things. On our trip, we heard the same complaints, that the money and resources were diverted to other areas.



General McCaffrey. I can certainly look into it and give you an answer for the record. There were some moneys diverted out of some of the State Department foreign accounts.

Generally speaking, it's my understanding that of the \$13.6 billion in enacted moneys, very little of it wasn't spent on what it was tabled for. I would suggest we have a bigger problem.

Mr. MICA. Well, we had \$45 million, as I understand, reprogrammed, and it ended up in Haiti. It came out of a State account. But I wish you would look at it and report back.

You have my full support, the leadership, everyone on this committee, both sides of the aisle, but we want to make certain that the resources that we dedicate are utilized in the war. Thank you.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you, Mr. Mica. Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McCaffrey, you talked about treatment. The Rand Corp. has said that drug treatment is the most effective drug control intervention. Would you agree with that?

General McCaffrey. That drug treatment is the most?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Cost-effective drug control intervention.

General McCaffrey. I think a better answer, Mr. Congressman, is that there isn't a most effective, and that none of these approaches are going to work until we understand that it is a system response that requires time to implement it.

I don't believe that drug treatment programs alone would be effective at all, but in combination with vigorous law enforcement, with interdiction, with drug education can give us another valuable piece of the overall strategy.

Mr. CUMMINGS. In Baltimore, it is estimated that we have 50,000 drug addicts out of 650,000 approximate population.

There is a program that I'm very familiar with called the McKinsey Group, and what they've done is they've got three major elements, and I'd really like for you to see this, because it's very effective.

No. 1, they have drug treatment through Hopkins Hospital, and these are all former inmates, most of whom have been to prison.

No. 2, they create jobs through working with the city of Baltimore, which is very significant, by the way, but if people don't have any jobs or have no hope, then it's kind of difficult for them—I think that's part of the problem, by the way—and it gives them an opportunity to make a living.

And it's working because I think it's bringing together a combination of things. You've got community. You've got the business community, and you have Government, because the city of Baltimore gives them contracts to renovate houses and things of this nature.

And I think you have to have those combinations working together. You were asking what can we do. I think we do have to have that.

And you talked about programs that you had seen as you had traveled across the country. Have you seen things that have worked, say, similar to what I just said?

General McCaffrey. Oh, no question. I think that at the heart of the matter, although, if I may, again let me remind you that 70

percent of the people abusing illegal drugs in America are employed.

They're causing accidents, unnecessary lawsuits, ineffective bottom line. They're abusing their families, their children, their spouses, they're getting AIDS, and they have a job.

So the other 30 percent? I've seen some magnificent things. Congressman Rangel took me to Striver House. Nobody has given them \$1 of money, and they've come together to try and pick up people on the bottom of the heap with enormous success.

The figures are arguable but probably a 70 percent success rate. Part of our challenge, all of us, is to understand the success in treatment programs isn't just a cure. It's dropping the terrible damage done by chronic drug addicts on America, on the health care system, property damage, et cetera.

So I fully agree with your point. You've got to get to that population.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You were talking about the whole question of interdiction, and you said that it does not appear that it drives down the cost of drugs, the street cost. Is that right? Is that what you said?

General McCAFFREY. I think the evidence that I believe is credible is that we've taken a third of the cocaine out of the pipeline.

The cost has remained flat. The availability has gone up slightly. The purity has never been higher than before. The payoff to us was that there are probably 200 metric tons of cocaine less in the system because of interdiction, and that's a lot of misery in American society that didn't occur.

Mr. CUMMINGS. It certainly is. I assume that, basically, if you look at it from that standpoint, apparently, these big drug shippers see this as part of the cost, basically, of doing business, I guess.

In other words, they expect to have a loss, so that's a part of it. Is that a fair statement?

General McCAFFREY. And so far they can get away with it because they're growing, perhaps, 900-plus metric tons, and we're using 240, 260 metric tons. So supply exceeds demand, and the cost markup is 200 to 1.

So you can almost say that the cost of drugs in America is an imputed value. It's scarcely a real free market economy.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

Mr. ZELIFF. Mr. Souder, from Indiana.

Mr. SOUDER. I have a couple of different lines of questions. First off, wouldn't you agree if you hadn't interdicted the one-third the price would have dropped on the street?

In other words, if there had been a greater supply, if we hadn't done the interdiction, probably price would have been affected?

General McCAFFREY. I had a spirited argument with our Deputy Treasury Secretary, Larry Summers, on just this point. Mr. Congressman, if I may, the greatest attribute of a good infantry officer, and I'm one, is frequently wrong but never in doubt.

So let me, if I may, suggest to you no, I don't believe right now that given this enormous availability of cocaine products and the nature of demand we are yet in an elastic supply demand function.

Drugs have never been cheaper, higher purity, more available. We got a third of it out of the system. Less Americans are using

cocaine, but they're using slightly more metric tonnages. So they're in hospitals.

You can't go to the model of selling Singer sewing machines and understand the drug business in America.

Mr. SOUDER. In Peru, when we met with the Government there out in the fields, they said because of the shoot-down policy that what they were finding was that because the price was relatively stable, because the interdiction costs were going up, they were having to reduce what they were paying the campesinos to grow it, and therefore less was being grown.

And over time they believe some may be stockpiled, but, in fact, interdiction was impacting supply prices at the level where we can affect growing. Would you agree with that?

In other words, if you have, in effect, not a supply driven price at this end, you can also influence the cost of production end through interdiction.

General McCaffrey. Yes. We've got some enormous tactical successes in Peru that we're very proud of, and there is an ongoing operation right now that we hope continues it.

I wouldn't want to be prematurely optimistic because this is a big international criminal enterprise. So they are adapting to our successful tactics.

They're now shipping cocaine out of Bolivia and elsewhere into the market, and they'll go to other delivery systems.

They're going to move to sea-based delivery more than air-based. We're not through this yet, but it's very encouraging, I agree, and your report documents that quite nicely.

Mr. SOUDER. I think every one of us agree and I would personally believe—I believe interdiction is misnamed. I believe that's the No. 1 prevention program, because if you prevent the drugs from getting in, if you could, that would be a prevention program, not interdiction.

But that all brands of what is traditionally called interdiction, prevention, and treatment are important, to some degree, the American people are getting discouraged because they don't see any of them working, and we need to have some success stories in each one.

I believe our problem in the treatment area is more substantive in our disagreements than just studies. Nancy Reagan, when she was at our first hearing, this committee, said "you don't win wars by treating the wounded."

You can say you don't necessarily just, for example, find treatments to cancer and things by just treating in the end the wounded and dealing with them on the deathbed, either, that cocaine is different from that.

But having been to Johns Hopkins, for example, in their crack mothers' treatment center, they were proud of the fact—and they have some of the best data—that they only have about an 80 percent recidivism rate.

It isn't a lack of data out there. There is disagreement over what constitutes success in the data, but very good universities have had long studies and short studies with it, but it doesn't appear that we can have a major impact on—we have good success stories in a few, but it's so minor compared to the overall.



And the key thing is that if the number of addicts keep increasing, even if you get off, if the pool is becoming bigger, you're in trouble.

When you say more studies, what are you thinking, and what type of things, given the fact that most universities around the country have been doing this for about 20 years?

General McCAFFREY. Well, first of all, don't let me portend to a greater level of expertise than I have. I've read a ton of material. I've been to some of these programs. I've certainly consulted with a lot of these folks who do understand the problem better than I, and I'd certainly cite both Mr. Califano and Mr. Burke and Phil Heyman up at Harvard University and others.

I don't think there is any argument, to be honest, that there are multiple drug treatment programs that are successful if you define "success" as enormous reductions in criminal behavior, in getting people back to work and reduction of the number of people who have AIDS.

I mean, any one of the programs I've been to, they have dropout rates. They have high recidivism rates, but almost without exception, whether it's a methadone program at Beth Israel Hospital or a jail-based treatment program such as Sheriff Sheehan runs out in Cook County, Chicago, all of them pay off in enormous amounts.

I do share your viewpoint. By the way, Mr. Congressman, the number of chronic addicts, surprisingly, isn't going up. It's maintaining a fairly stable rate, although heroin and methamphetamines are the next problems on the horizon.

But this chronic group of addicts, the argument for treatment—here is where we get in trouble on the analogy of warfare. I know warfare. I've been studying it and doing it since I was 17 years old.

Your wounded are a tragedy. You try and cycle them back into combat, but while they're wounded, they don't destroy your rear area, and the chronic drug addicts of America are not killing themselves, such as those who smoke cigarettes.

They're wrecking their families, their neighborhoods in all parts of the cities. So I would suggest you have to go after that group as a balanced part of your program.

In and of itself, by itself, it would be a hopeless way to go about the problem. I agree. You've got to give priority to education of young people and to manage down the input to the system, which is also doable.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you, Mr. Souder. You talk about balance, General McCaffrey, and you also indicated that you're not convinced interdiction changes the street value.

I don't think either one of us are qualified to be economists at this point, but we've heard a lot that is contrary to that statement.

If you have a success going prior to 1992, in terms of interdiction and source country efforts, why is it you wouldn't go back to 1992 when you're looking at 1997 and at least bring it up to the same level and address some of the things that everybody out there is telling us and I'm sure they've told you that we should be doing?

Why do we continue to not fund two areas that were working? They're really low bases compared to treatment, and they're low bases compared to prevention and education.

Why is it that we just turn our backs on two areas that were working in 1992? We took them apart. We defunded them. We took away things that were working.

Wouldn't a reasonable man take a look at that and say we ought to at least go back to that level?

General McCAFFREY. Well, Mr. Congressman, let me join you in a commitment to the interdiction and source country operations.

I don't think there is any question but that it has to be an essential part of the program. This budget increases drug interdiction by 7.3 percent and again by 25 percent in two subareas that we think are critical.

I will listen very carefully to your viewpoint on whether we ought to add even more money. Certainly, the \$250 million is essential to jump-starting interdiction.

Now, if I may offer a viewpoint, though, we can't go back to 1992, because it isn't the same enemy threat. If we want to go back to the interdiction by air warfare, they're not flying drugs from Colombia to south Florida. That ain't the game anymore.

So the easy pickings are over, and indeed now, when the Coast Guard makes a big seizure 600 miles out in the Eastern Pacific, it was good intel that paid off. It wasn't ship steaming hours.

We knew the ship was out there, went after it, seized it. It took us 3 days to bust it up enough to find the drugs. As I remember, it was 17 tons.

So the payoff on interdiction in the future is more likely to be smart intelligence than it is ships on station and flying hour program, but we do need vigorous interdiction, and I join you in that.

Mr. ZELIFF. And there are programs that are needed that are not now being done involving intelligence and some assets in radar, that we need to move forward on.

We originally talked \$500 million. Then we went with \$250. We didn't move quick enough to get the \$250 out there. I guess my last question, and then I'll turn it over to Mr. Hastert and then Mrs. Thurman, we need a plan.

I know your timetable shows a plan in a few months, but we need a plan, I believe, that updates that 1997 plan which you just released 2 weeks ago.

We need a plan that does more than dust off the previous plan. And again, we're not trying to make you do the impossible, but we have a lot of people that have seen on both sides of the aisle a failed effort.

We need to convince them that we have a new commitment, and I believe we do have a new commitment on both sides of the aisle, but we need to have the guts of the plan, the systems approach that you've been talking about, the quantifiable goals.

And again, if there is a commitment to interdiction and source country programs, then let's fund them at the level where they'll be successful, wherever that level is.

In our other programs that are being wasted, we need to pull together and make sure that we shoot with a rifle and not a shotgun.

So I guess what I'm saying is that as soon as we can get that plan, can you tell us when that will be so that we can get the resources from our side and both sides of the aisle committed to the effort that you need?

It's like the chicken and the egg, but we need to bring them both together at the same time.

General MCCAFFREY. Let me, if I may, respond to you. I just had a session with Admiral Bob Kramek, a very dedicated and effective public servant who went through the same line of argument.

It seems to me what I can offer the country is a strategy and a budget, and there ought to be a 5-year budget, not a 1-year budget.

I ought to come down here every year, in my judgment, and tell you here is the 5-year projection so you can debate the wisdom of years 5, 4 and 3 and then give me final course corrections on years 2 and 1.

I also ought to write a strategy. Then I ought to provide oversight to the other agencies of Government to ensure that the strategy is being carried out.

But I'm a little bit uneasy about the notion of another plan. What I have offered you in accordance with the law is the strategy, the conceptual organization that ought to guide our actions, and it also is a 1997 budget, which I ought to listen to very carefully as to what you're saying about it.

But the plans that guide our actions will be written by CINC SOUTHCOM, by the USIC, by HHS.

There really isn't any linkage that a policy operation does to explain that. Now, I can gain any visibility needed to act as a messenger, the spokesman for the Government on how the subordinate elements are going to carry out the strategy.

Mr. ZELIFF. But you see my concern that until we get those quantifiable goals and we get those things that we can measure and we get the list of specifics and we get the completion of the strategy that you've laid out by SOUTHCOM or all the rest, we've to get our arms around this thing so we can believe in it.

And if we don't believe in it, we'll never commit to the war on drugs, and we've got to be able to commit to winning that war. Do I make sense?

General MCCAFFREY. Yes, indeed. Of course you do. I think, though, you should understand that that is the strategy that's on the table. Chapter 1 particularly, which was the focus of our attention, outlines in what I hope you'll find to be a coherent and persuasive manner the system that we're trying to carry out.

And then I've taken the 1997 budget and can explain it to you in terms of that strategy. That's really what's on the table. I think the 1997 budget needs to be buttressed by the supplement, the \$250 million supplemental.

Now, the subordinate elements of that strategy are a series of plans that are already written. Laser Strike is ongoing right now. That's a new initiative. The Puerto Rico-Virgin Islands is a new initiative.

The Southwest Border plan is a new initiative. So there are a series of supporting plans, and I'd be glad to share those with you and listen to your own views on them.

Mr. ZELIFF. We've talked with the Governor of Puerto Rico, and we're aware of that. We've been down on several different trips on this.

Our concern here is that we're still not addressing some of the problems, but we'll need to save that for another day. Mr. Hastert and then Mrs. Thurman.

Mr. HASTERT. A couple things. First of all, General, do you have the staff that you need to get your job done?

General MCCAFFREY. No, not at all.

Mr. HASTERT. What's the problem?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, we just got the money, \$3.4 million. I've got some enormously dedicated people. I've got some brilliant economists. I've got some people that have been working at this for——

Mr. HASTERT. Do those brilliant economists tell us there is elastic demand?

General MCCAFFREY. Among other people, along with the other people I've consulted, but we're going to go out and try and hire the right men and women in the right skills to develop a 154-person organization.

And I'll move on that project as quickly as we can in a sound manner.

Mr. HASTERT. I think that's very important.

General MCCAFFREY. Yes, sir. I agree.

Mr. HASTERT. The race is on. We need to be up to speed.

General MCCAFFREY. Yes, sir. I agree.

Mr. HASTERT. Let me ask you just a couple things. You talked about you have just come back from Mexico and tried, I guess, politically to smooth some things over there a little bit.

On the other hand, you said you had visited with President Lozano. We certified Mexico. Probably politically there is some reason why we did that.

There is a long way that we have to go in solidifying the cooperation between our two countries. I think you said some of the things that the Congress has touched on.

We had talked, or at least when I was down there, I talked with the Mexican Congress, and after we got beat up on some other issues, we finally got down to business and talked about the other things that they have to do, and I think they're moving in the right direction.

I think Mexico and Colombia are two key countries. Nobody is more key than anybody else, I guess, but two key countries are Mexico and Colombia.

We decertified Colombia, basically, because we have some political differences or constitutional problems with the President of Colombia.

Talk about heros, we have a couple people down there that we have built a pretty solid program around. They need help. How are we going to get that help down there basically, to Serrano and Valdiviso?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I certainly agree with your point of view that Colombia is essential to the effort. They're under tremendous internal attack.

They're facing a struggle that in terms of sheer bloodshed is worse than most infantry divisions faced in the Gulf war.



Our decertification of Colombia was a decertification of the seriousness of purpose of the Government, of the leadership, not of the Colombian police forces and armed forces and judges.

So they do deserve our support, and none of our counter-drug support is affected by that decertification. We certified Mexico for a lot of reasons among which was we think they have a patriotic, dedicated military and political leadership that are going to confront this problem not to protect the American people, but to protect the Mexican people.

They've got tremendous challenges, and we're just going to have to work with them over the decade.

Mr. HASTERT. I agree. We hope that we have a decade to work with those folks. We said the race is on. I think there are some crucial things that we need to get done there, or we lose a very important strategic area that is very important.

The other two areas, and we haven't talked about this before, but I think we need to beef up our ability to work with Brazil.

Certainly, as the air interdiction in Peru and other places becomes more successful, Brazil becomes more important.

I understand that we haven't really focused in on Venezuela, and Venezuela is becoming a very crucial part of this puzzle. Can you elaborate on that a little bit?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, Mr. Congressman, I think your remarks are right on the point. First of all, there can't be a sensible policy in Latin America unless Brazilian leadership is part of it, and they are very much involved.

They're under enormous threat themselves, their own young people, their own cities, from the drug menace.

They are clearly committed to protecting their own airspace and to stopping the transit of drugs which is causing such enormous harm in Rio and other cities.

Venezuela, which has an absolutely brilliant and dedicated minister of defense, Mr. Arusco, GEN Arusco, is similarly aware that they are the next avenue of approach for the drug menace.

As we become more effective in Mexico and Colombia, it's going to go out through Venezuela and Ecuador, and they were also working very closely with us to protect their own people.

Caracas, on a long weekend, may have 70 to 100 murders in a city of 1 million people. So they need help, and we are committed to doing that.

Mr. HASTERT. General, my time is about to be up, and we have a vote on. One thing that I wanted to say to you. I admire you. I admire your work at SOUTHCOM. You have a big job.

You can't do it by yourself. This Congress I think is committed to working with you. I think, in my estimation, your predecessor left some things on the deck that haven't been very well taken care of.

We have a long way to go to rectify some of those problems. We've seen the drug problem in this country since 1992 get worse and worse.

We need to think beyond the conventional box. I would hope that when you start to put together the plan that you give to us you think beyond that conventional box. What are the things we have to do? Where do we have to attack?

I understand you need to put together all the agencies, all the components of this picture to get it done, but the quicker we get it done and quicker we start to move on this the better off we are, and I would look forward to working with you to do that.

General McCAFFREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ZELIFF. Mrs. Thurman.

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, just briefly for a comment. General, I think something that has been overlooked is, there have been other initiatives in other areas of our budgets that actually pick up some of the slack that I think we're getting some criticism on, whether it's INS or Border Patrol or whomever.

We're seeing a lot of money being put into those areas to secure our borders. We've seen some transfers with Southwest. We're seeing fences put up. So there is a lot of other things that are going on that I think help with the interdiction issue.

Quite honestly, I think some of the things that we do in education is probably helpful for prevention. So there is a combination of other things.

So while we go through this dialog up here, let's not forget that as we've all said that this is something that our local officials, our communities, our parents, everybody is involved in.

So I think we also have to look at that from the perspective of all you have our budgets that are out there that we're also trying to use to try to get to some of these answers and to these questions or these questions for these answers that we're looking for.

So in the discussion later on, I hope that we will start to remember those things as well and bring those in as part of the discussion.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you. Mr. Souder, do have you a quick 10-second comment?

Mr. SOUDER. I wanted to say that I hope we can work together in looking at the education and treatment side. I'm also on the Subcommittee of Government Reform on that.

When I was Republican staff director of the Children Family Committee in 1984 through 1988, we were looking at this over on the Senate side with Senator Coates.

Rather than another of rhetoric about—and there is a tendency to pull in programs that say, hey, we're helping people and so on, we need to have some real good data if we're going to make these arrangements.

And if we can work on a timetable, maybe we can have some joint hearings with that subcommittee as well to show the interrelationships. Thank you.

Mr. ZELIFF. I'd just like to add that I think the nut of our concern on your plan that we've read is that we'd like you to take another look at interdiction and source country programs.

If you come back in 2 weeks and if you can convince the President—I don't think we're that far off, but we've heard too much information from too many people to just be able to not make that commitment.

We'd love to debate it and discuss it with you and then have you back here in 2 weeks, and let's talk a little bit more.

We want to fight for the assets you need, but we want to make sure that the assets you are asking for are what is going to be needed to win the war.

And we have some great concerns that it's not balanced yet, and we'd like you to, if you would, review those areas. Let's meet again informally, and then, if you would be willing to come back in 2 weeks or thereabouts, we'd like to rediscuss that.

We thank you very much for being here. Would that be agreeable to you, sir?

General MCCAFFREY. Sure. At your convenience.

Mr. ZELIFF. Great. And again, I think you have a lot of friends on both sides of the aisle here. It's not a partisan issue. It's one that we're all committed to.

We have a breakfast in the Congress now of 50 or 60 folks. Charlie Rangel and I are working on that.

We've had various task forces. We're going to get out there and give you what you need, but we've got to make sure it's the right plan. Thank you very much for being here.

General MCCAFFREY. Thank you.

Mr. ZELIFF. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY  
Washington, D.C. 20503


August 14, 1996

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed are responses to the questions submitted following the May 8 hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security. Hope that they will be useful.

Thank you for your support and leadership on this issue. Please continue to send us your thoughts and ideas.

Respectfully,



Bob Brown  
Deputy Chief of Staff

The Honorable William J. Zeff, Jr.  
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight  
Subcommittee on National Security, International  
Affairs, and Criminal Justice  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington D.C. 20515



Question:

1. The President's 1996 Strategy shows more heavy emphasis on treatment of hardcore addicts. The FY 1997 request is a record \$2.9 billion, a \$129 million increase over the FY 1996 level that many experts thought was too high already. Do you personally agree that we should, as the President's request indicates, be: (A) spending substantially more on treatment than on prevention; (B) spending more than half a billion dollars more on treatment in 1997 than in 1992, yet nearly \$100 million less on interdiction than in 1992, and more than \$100 million less on source country programs than in 1992?

Answer:

The 1996 Strategy provides a balanced, systematic approach to solving this nation's drug problem. Included in this balanced approach is a continued focus on providing treatment to reduce drug use and its consequences -- as one component of a systematic and interconnected response. Working together with the other components of the strategy -- prevention, domestic law enforcement, interdiction, and international programs -- treatment can reduce the size of the drug-using population and the costs of drug use to the Nation.

A number of studies clearly indicate that treatment is a cost effective way to reduce the consequences of drug use and the extreme costs it levies on society. Further, as the Gallup poll indicates, Americans are troubled by hardcore drug use and its devastating consequences to society, and they support providing drug treatment for those who need it and believe that treatment works.

Effective and timely treatment will allow us to intervene early in the cycle of addiction. Early intervention is critical in order to reach youth, many of whom would benefit most readily from treatment. This is also the most efficient way to do business. Intervention as early as is possible in the drug use continuum simplifies the task of the treatment provider and makes treatment less expensive and more successful. The drug user has had less time for the more insidious effects of drug use to take hold. Criminal behaviors are less entrenched, other high risk behaviors are less ingrained, general health is better, and recovery and rehabilitation are less problematic.

The \$2.9 billion figure you mention includes all funding for treatment, not just that for hardcore addicts. One-third of those funds are found in the budget of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), one of the largest providers of substance abuse treatment services in the country. The DVA plays a major role in the provision of services to veterans who are "service connected" or indigent. Without DVA treatment intervention, a substantial proportion of the drug-using population would remain without treatment and, therefore, contribute substantially to increased demand for illegal drugs, creating serious problems for already overburdened city, county, State, and voluntary treatment facilities.

Treatment and interdiction are both effective means for reducing illegal drug use and its consequences in America. The *1996 National Drug Control Strategy* sets forth strategic goals that provide a balanced and comprehensive approach which addresses all aspects of the drug problem and its consequences. This approach requires devoting resources to counter both the demand for and the supply of illicit drugs. The 1996 Strategy seeks to fund critical demand and supply reduction programs that will effectively reduce illegal drug use. Each program will be evaluated on its ability to further the goals and objectives of the Strategy. Effective programs will be funded at appropriate levels and ineffective programs will be reduced or eliminated regardless of which particular goal they support.

Interdiction remains a critical component of the Strategy. Since 1992, the drug threat in both transit zone and source countries has changed. In the transit zone, we have seen a shift from transporting drugs via aircraft to maritime vessels both commercial and non-commercial. Therefore, detection has become more difficult. Source country successes in 1995 have altered the drug threat as well. The capture of key leaders of the Colombian drug cartels and the successful interdiction of the air bridge linking growing areas of Peru with production and distribution networks in Colombia has altered the structure of narco-trafficking organizations and forced them to change smuggling routes and methods.

In order to better address the detection problem, the 1996 Strategy seeks to increase the use of cued intelligence and intelligence products. During 1995, the quality of cued intelligence and intelligence products in general proved to be highly beneficial to successful interdiction operations. We are currently assessing programs that build upon our 1995 successes in source country operations. These include programs which target illicit drug production, and efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and law enforcement operations so that source countries may improve their own counter-drug activities.

The \$250 million supplemental appropriation requested in April would provide an additional \$168 million for counter-drug interdiction and source country activities.

#### Question:

2. Will you return to the President and propose that the 1996 strategy be revised to reflect the need for a re-setting of those priorities?

#### Answer:

The *1996 National Drug Control Strategy* presented to the Congress April 29, 1996, sets the appropriate goals to guide the nation's drug priorities. These goals will provide the basis for development of measures of effectiveness, both to evaluate our efforts and to satisfy the requirements of the Government Performance Results Act. The Strategy's goals begin with the

individual--motivating youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse, continue on to address the health and crime consequences generated by drug trafficking, and move outward to counter the production, transportation and smuggling of drugs into the United States. The many drug treatment and prevention groups, law enforcement organizations and international elements that ONDCP works with have unanimously responded with strong support to the goals and priorities laid out in the Strategy.

Question:

3. How do you square the contradictions in the RAND study offered by ONDCP to defend added spending on drug treatment? In particular, how do you excuse the flaws that (A) the RAND study omitted consideration of prevention and its cost efficiency; (B) the study measured only directly traceable results (minimizing the effectiveness of law enforcement, interdiction and source country programs, whose results are necessarily indirect); (C) and the study called source country programs the least effective use of counternarcotics monies, and yet the Administration's so called "controlled shift" was supposedly into source country programs?

Answer:

By necessity, the RAND model uses a common unit of measurement (cocaine consumption) to review the relative effectiveness of components of the Strategy (treatment, domestic enforcement, interdiction, and source country programs). Because one important element of drug prevention programs is to stop drug use before it starts (i.e., to deter consumption), this Strategy program area did not lend itself to RAND's formal modeling approach.

The RAND study found that treatment is most cost effective at the margin. In other words, RAND's model says that if one were to spend an additional dollar on drug control, it should go to treatment. However, RAND does not say that treatment alone can solve the drug problem -- supply control also plays an important role that must be continued.

Question:

4. Specifically, what is the average percentage of (a) crack, (b) cocaine, and (c) heroin addicts who are drug-free five years after participation in federally-funded drug treatment programs? One year? If there are insufficient follow-up studies, why is that so, and on what do you base your belief that these programs leave someone drug free after five years? One year?

Answer:

The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) has funded numerous national large scale studies that have examined various treatment outcomes for the opioid addict (primarily with addicts in methadone maintenance treatment). Also the House Select Committee on Aging, Subcommittee on Health and Long-term Care, studied the same issue in a 1991 white paper. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has also studied this topic.

Research has demonstrated the effectiveness of treatment for all addictions. However, long-term effectiveness, to date, has focused primarily on the opiate addict. Although opioids are the preferred drug of choice, most opiate addicts are poly-substance abusers, notably with the use of cocaine and crack cocaine. Therefore, an effective decrease in opioid usually results in a corresponding decline in use of cocaine and crack cocaine.

Research into the effectiveness of cocaine treatment is not as strong as for opiate treatment. However, there is an accumulating body of studies--none long term--pointing to the effectiveness of psychosocial treatment modalities. As yet, there is not a pharmacologic agent for the treatment of cocaine addiction or a medication to reduce cocaine craving.

Indicators of effectiveness of treatment usually, in addition to length of abstinence from opioid drugs, include: reduction in the use of other illicit drugs, such as cocaine and crack cocaine; reduction in criminal activity; improvements in social health and productivity; improvements in health conditions; retention in addiction treatment; and reduction in HIV infection rates and transmission. The length of time in treatment is, however, the best indicator of post-treatment success, particularly in regards to abstinence after treatment. Methadone maintenance patients who remained in treatment for at least 3 months experienced dramatic improvements during treatment with regard to daily illicit opioid use, cocaine use, and predatory crime. These improvements persisted for 3- to 5- years following treatment, but at reduced levels.

In a study of 268 opioid addicts 2.5 years following methadone treatment: (1) addicts were generally abstinent and psychologically stable when they left treatment; (2) during the 6-month period following treatment, addicts began to abuse alcohol and other drugs and experience social deterioration; (3) when reentering treatment, 75 percent stayed for more than 6 months and improved steadily in most areas.

The Drug Abuse Reporting Program (DARP) studies (based on 44,000 patients applying for and admitted to 4 types of treatment in 52 programs across the United States and Puerto Rico) of addicts 6- and 12-years following admission to treatment showed that illicit opioid use declined progressively over time until year 6, when it stabilized at about 40 percent for "any" use and 25 percent for "daily" use.



Both the DARP and another major national study (TOPS involving 11,750 drug abusers) found that long treatment duration was the strongest predictor of reduced heroin use among methadone maintenance patients: longer lengths of stay are associated with greater reductions in heroin use over time.

Question:

5. Contrary to the strict language of the 1988 Drug Abuse Act, Section 1005, the President's 1994, 1995, and now 1996 Strategies have absolutely no numerical or proportional quantifiable goals. As you know, this is in sharp contrast to prior strategies (see, e.g. pages 30 and 31 of our Committee's annual report). How do you justify this failure to conform to the statute?

Answer:

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, requires the annual Strategy to include "comprehensive, research-based, long-range goals for reducing drug abuse ... [and] short-term measurable objectives which the Director [of the Office of National Drug Control Policy] determines may be realistically achieved." There is nothing in law requiring that numeric objectives be established for the Strategy's goals, only that they be measurable. Nevertheless, ONDCP will establish out-year goals against which the Strategy programs will be evaluated.

Question:

6. Will you return to the President and propose that the statutory mandate of numerical and proportional goals be complied with this year, and that these be inserted into a revised 1996 strategy?

Answer:

As a part of the increased staffing and reorganization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, ONDCP will establish numerical goals for the Strategy. In addition, ONDCP has established a special office devoted to developing measures of effectiveness (MOE) for each major program that comprises the Strategy and supports its goals and objectives. The objectives under each goal define the general course we will take and the outcomes we seek. The MOEs will provide the numerical and proportional information you seek. Further, they will help to guide the development of the Strategy and provide the information needed to better focus our efforts and make necessary budget decisions.

Question:

7. Can you explain why the number of drug related federal prosecutions dropped over the period 1993 to 1994 12 percent, and can you assure us that you will insist that the Department of Justice increase this percentage this year?

Answer:

Our drug law enforcement efforts have been aggressive. There are currently about 48,000 convicted drug dealers in federal prisons -- 60 percent of the total Federal inmate population and the highest number in history. Drug case filings by U.S. Attorneys jumped 13 percent in FY 95.

Our strategy to disrupt and dismantle the infrastructure of drug trafficking organizations is also being aggressively pursued. We have more Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) cases filed, longer sentences for OCDETF defendants, and more court-approved wiretaps than ever before.

The decline in Federal prosecutions during 1993 to 1994 appears to be the result of uniformly modest, but widespread decreases throughout most of the U.S. According to a 1994 report of the Administration Office of the U.S. Courts, court personnel in some districts attribute these decreases to the policies of then new U.S. Attorneys who de-emphasized prosecution of small-scale drug offenders.

A strong law enforcement program is a key element of the 1996 Strategy to address the Nation's drug problem; those who traffick in illegal drugs must be investigated, prosecuted, and incarcerated to the full extent of the law.

Question:

8. Under the law, you have 2 percent budget authority on the counternarcotics front--do you expect to exercise that authority?

Answer:

I am fully aware of the 2 percent reprogramming authority provided to the Director, ONDCP, and support the intent of this authority. However, to date, I have not encountered a budget issue that would require the exercise of this authority.

Question:

9. Do you think Congress should seek to increase the ONDCP Director's budget authority, and if so, by how much?

Answer:

For now, additional authorities are not needed. What is critical is the bipartisan support of Congress for the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy. For example, Congressional support is imperative in order to provide a stable environment for the long-range planning commitments that the Strategy outlines. In addition, Congressional support for the resources proposed to implement the Strategy is critical if the Strategy's goals are to be achieved.

Question:

10. The recent inroads against the Cali cartel in Colombia were the result of carefully vetted local police and military units. DEA asked for as little as \$10 million this year to finance this successful vetted unit program, which seems to exist on a shoe string, yet in the originally proposed \$250 million reprogramming, ONDCP gave zero funding to this previously successful effort. Why? Will you seek an earmark for this money in the fiscal 1997 budget?

Answer:

There are a number of on-going initiatives concerning vetted units in Latin America. Establishment of vetted units is dependent upon host nation approval, and is invariably a sensitive political issue within the host nation. Particular initiatives should be discussed in a classified venue. We are supportive of additional funding for these units and agree that they are an important component of our international supply programs, but specific additional funding needs for vetted units were not known to ONDCP during consideration of the President's \$250 million reallocation initiative. As specific proposals mature and receive host nation backing, ONDCP will work very hard to secure the necessary funds.

Question:

11. Your predecessor advanced the "controlled shift" strategy. He ended much of the interdiction efforts in the name of that shift, yet the funds never showed up in the source countries. (A) Why did those monies not show up in the source countries? (B) Is the source country controlled shift being abandoned or will revisions be made in the current budget request to refund it?

Answer:

Due to Congressional budget cuts in fiscal years 1993 and 1994 to drug interdiction operations, fewer resources have been made available for these operations. For the past several years, Congress has not funded fully the budget request for the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). However, beginning with operation Green Clover in 1995, and followed by operation Laser Strike in 1996, available drug interdiction assets have been increasingly shifted to the source countries to disrupt the narcotic air bridge linking growing areas in Peru with labs and distribution networks in Colombia.

Assisting source countries to reduce the supply of illegal narcotics is an important part of the comprehensive approach to fighting drugs that also includes education, treatment, domestic law enforcement, and interdiction. The National Drug Control Strategy does just that. Goal #5 specifically calls for us to "Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply." The Strategy is supported by a \$15.1 billion FY97 budget request, \$400 million of which will specifically support international programs and \$1.437 billion to support interdiction. In addition, \$169 million of the \$250 million initiative to reallocate funds in support of counter-drug programs would go to support international and interdiction programs.

Our strategy is to determine where the traffickers are most vulnerable, and apply pressure there. The shift in emphasis to source country programs is based on taking advantage of the political will of source countries to disrupt the flow of drugs where it can be detected and disrupted more easily. Fewer targets emanating closer to known points of origin make detection and monitoring easier, targets are more easily identifiable, and a smaller geographic area needs to be covered. Additionally, with the cooperation of the host nations, specific trafficking organizations can be identified and targeted.

This strategy puts the United States, working side-by-side with our allies, on the offensive, hitting the trafficker's production and distribution networks and organizational structures in their home turf.

Even though funding has not been at the levels desired, the shift in emphasis to source country programs has been effective. Major cocaine cartel leaders have been arrested. Actions taken against the Peru to Colombia air bridge severely disrupted this mode of transport and the cocaine economy in much of Peru. Regional cooperation in South America is at an all time high.



Question:

12. As you know, President Clinton cut the \$523 million that was going to source country programs in 1992 down to \$400 in the current strategy. Will you ask him, specifically, to bring that number back to \$523 million or more in the 1997 budget, particularly in view of the progress recently shown by Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, and the obvious need for new INL, DEA and AID alternative development monies?

Answer:

Since the submission of the initial counternarcotics budget, Congress has not fully supported the international budget request. For example, a cumulative total of \$1,316.9 million was submitted to Congress for international drug-related activities during FY 1994 through FY 1996. During this same time period, Congress appropriated \$944.7 million or \$372.2 million less than requested. The FY 1997 drug control budget includes a \$400 million request for international counternarcotic activities. Included in this is a \$213 million request for the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL); of which the House has appropriated only \$150 million, the Senate has appropriated \$213 million as requested. The INL budget includes a \$35.5 million enhancement for Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.

Question:

13. Peru has shown great progress in the last year through its shoot down policy. Why not press Mexico and others in the region to adopt a similar policy?

Answer:

Before we press Mexico or other countries, certain matters must be resolved. Among these are: the impact of international and U. S. domestic law, the extent of the drug trafficking threat to the national security of the country in question, and the procedures the target country has in effect to protect against innocent loss of life. The effect that adoption of a shoot down policy by a particular nation would have on drug trafficking must also be determined as would the risks associated with such a policy. This determination would then provide a basis to assess whether the benefits of having a nation adopt a shoot down policy would actually outweigh the risks involved.

By Federal law, before the U.S can provide assistance to a country to implement air intercept policies that might include the use of force against civil aircraft in flight, the President must determine that:

- Illicit drug trafficking poses an extraordinary threat to the national security of that country; and
- The country has appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent loss of life that could result from interdiction.

Question:

14. 70% of the 400 tons of cocaine that enter the U.S. come from or through Mexico, and this country also makes 150 tons of methamphetamine, most of which ends up in the U.S. In view of the number of U.S. kids dying from drugs and drug-related violence, how do you justify -- in all honesty -- certifying that Mexico was, last year, "cooperating fully" with our counternarcotics efforts? If you do believe they were fully cooperating, how do you define "full cooperation?"

Answer:

Mexico is faced with a serious drug control problem, as illustrated by your question. The seriousness of the threat is what led President Zedillo to characterize drug trafficking as the most dangerous threat to Mexican national security.

Considering the resources available to Mexico to combat the threat, we are convinced that the government is fully cooperating with the United States in our counternarcotics efforts. There is widespread corruption in Mexico's law enforcement systems, which the Mexicans themselves have admitted. President Zedillo personally gave direction to increase the role of the military -- normally acknowledged to be the institution least affected by corruption -- in drug control operations. That move presents political difficulties for President Zedillo. Further, the Attorney General is working closely with the U.S. government to develop special police units free from corruption to carry out important counterdrug operations. The legislature also recently passed new legislation to criminalize money laundering and to make it easier to prosecute drug traffickers. We are working together to devise a way to prevent the diversion of essential and precursor chemicals to the drug business, and our two governments are in nearly constant contact at a high level to assure that counter drug initiatives go forward.

We believe that the top leadership in Mexico consists of honest, patriotic citizens who are doing their best to rid their country of illegal drugs. That immense quantities of drugs pass through or are made in Mexico reflects more the depth of the problem than that the government is failing to cooperate fully under the circumstances.

Question:

15. As a member of President Clinton's cabinet and head of a cabinet council, both positions we strongly support, we would like to be assured that you have a permanent place at all cabinet meetings -- a permanent chair, if you will, such as the Attorney General or Secretary of Defense. Specifically, is that the case, and if not, are you planning to suggest such an arrangement?

Answer:

Since the beginning of this Administration, the Director of ONDCP has been a permanent member of the Cabinet and fully participates in all Cabinet deliberations.

Question:

16. There have been a number of public reports that the national security council placed the drug threat at number 29 on a list of 29 national security priorities in February of 1993. Do you know what the number is now? Do you know why it was dropped to Number 29?

Answer:

We have been unable to identify the February 1993 list to which the question refers. The drug threat has been and continues to be a priority national security issue, one of a number of such issues. Narcotics trafficking, along with weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, terrorism and organized crime, has security implications both for present and long-term American policy. Illegal narcotics trafficking and use are severely damaging the social fabric of our society and those of many nations worldwide, including those where drugs are grown and processed. Trafficking has had, or threatens to have, serious impact on the internal stability of a number of source or transit countries. Protecting ourselves requires both cooperation among the agencies within our government and the help of countries whose peace and freedoms are also jeopardized.

Question:

17. General, you have been outspoken on the need for better regional coordination in the source countries -- have you proposed to the President that he organize a hemispheric summit led by President Clinton which brings together the Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, Colombia and Mexico? If not, why not? If so, what has the response been to this suggestion?

Answer:

I have not made any such recommendation because I am not convinced that a hemispheric summit is the best mechanism to achieve better regional coordination. We have had summits in the past, most recently in Miami, with significant counterdrug components. They were useful in focusing attention on narcotics, but we are still trying to finish the work begun there.

Before we propose another summit we need to determine what form sustainable regional counterdrug cooperation should take. Then, if a summit seems like the best mechanism to make it happen, we will consider organizing one.

Question:

18. The Colombia government made major advances in the drug war last year, and you have said so yourself several times. What is the real reason that Colombia was de-certified this year?

Answer:

While there were many law enforcement successes in Colombia in 1995, it remained the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine, and was a major supplier of heroin and marijuana. Colombia surpassed Bolivia to become the world's second largest producer of coca leaf. Colombia continued as a home for one of the world's most powerful and ruthless criminal organizations that dominate international cocaine trade, and lacked the political will to support efforts of law enforcement agencies.

The Samper Administration lacked commitment to support the efforts of Colombian law enforcement entities and to strengthen the nation's institutions to combat the destructive effects of narcotics traffickers. While we praise the courageous efforts of the Colombian National police and elements of the Colombian military, their efforts to bring traffickers to justice in the courts were undercut by the corrosive impact of drug-related corruption.

Question:

19. Specifically, in what areas did the Colombians fail to perform when asked on the counternarcotics front?



Answer:

Colombia failed to make progress in many areas. The Colombians failed to pass legislation to increase penalties for drug trafficking, and took no legislative steps to safeguard investigative information. They failed to enter into a bilateral maritime agreement with the U.S. Cali leadership continues to manage their illicit businesses while incarcerated. In January, Cali kingpin Jose Santacruz Londono escaped from his Colombian jail in a woefully inadequate prison system. Following his escape, there reportedly was a house cleaning of sorts in the prison's leadership, although we are not yet certain how effective it has been.

Question:

20. What specific targets and goals have you given the Colombians in order for them to be re-certified in 1997?

Answer:

Recertification will require the Government of Colombia to continue to follow through on the goals outlined by President Samper in February 1995, and remedy those deficiencies that have been pointed out. The Department of State, in conjunction with ONDCP and other agencies, is working on the specifics to be provided to the Colombian Government.

Question:

21. Since 1992, the President has eliminated key intelligence, detection and monitoring assets from the transit zone, as well as having cut the overall effort by roughly \$100 million dollars in each of the last three years -- and his fiscal year 1997 budget request is no different. In view of the success that everyone from Admiral Yost and Admiral Kramek to President Clinton's former DEA Head Judge Bonner attribute to the 1992 spending on interdiction in the transit zone, are you planning to suggest to the President that this priority be re-elevated in the fiscal year 1997 budget?

Answer:

Transit zone interdiction is an important part of the systems approach to fighting drugs that also includes education, treatment, domestic law enforcement, and international cooperation. The 1996 comprehensive anti-drug strategy does just that. Goal #4 specifically calls for us to "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat." The Strategy is supported by a \$15.1 billion FY97 budget request, \$1.437 billion of which will specifically support interdiction.

The past successes in the Caribbean must be considered within the context of the total system and the current situation. The level of seizures in any particular region is a function of the level of smuggling activity in that region and our effectiveness in detecting and disrupting the traffick.

Following a review of counter-drug interdiction policy by the National Security Council, the Administration adopted a cocaine strategy which included a controlled shift in emphasis on interdiction from the transit zones to the source countries. Under the previous policy, interdiction resources were concentrated primarily in the interdiction transit zone and relied heavily on surface and air patrolling to locate targets of interest. Our strategy is to determine where the traffickers are most vulnerable, and apply pressure to disrupt the flow of drugs. This is the essence of our "controlled shift" toward emphasis on source nation interdiction.

However, due to both reductions in Administration requests and Congressional budget cuts in international and interdiction programs, the controlled shift did not occur until last year with the advent of Operation Green Clover. Since FY93, Congress has cut the interdiction and international programs budget requests by \$1.356 billion as shown below:

	Requested	Appropriated		
FY93	\$2987.7M	\$2284.2M	-\$703.3M	-24%
FY94	\$2255.2M	\$1651.3M	-\$603.9M	-27%
FY95	\$1633.4M	\$1603.2M	- \$30.2M	- 2%
FY96	\$1677.5M	\$1658.9M	- \$18.6M	- 1%

The shift in emphasis to source country programs has been effective. Seven of eight major cartel leaders in Colombia have been arrested. Also, actions taken against the Peru to Colombia air bridge severely disputed this mode of transport and the cocaine economy in much of Peru.

The situation in the transit zone is significantly different than it was in the early 90's. It is no longer a "target rich environment"; random patrols and boardings, although a deterrent, are much less productive than before. Traffickers are no longer making numerous, easily detected flights into Florida. The air to surface mode ratio has shifted to maritime, an environment where targets are more numerous, harder to sort, tougher to monitor undetected, and especially hard to detect when hidden in bulk commercial cargo. Traffickers are now applying technology to reduce their vulnerability, i.e., using commercially available accurate Global Positioning System which substantially reduces their need to communicate when coordinating a rendezvous.

We cannot abandon interdiction in the transit zone. If a sufficiently robust capability is not left in place as a deterrent, the traffickers will merely return to their old, and cheaper, modes and routes. What we do need to do is improve the effectiveness of interdiction systems and leverage technology rather than merely increasing the number of systems.

One key to effective maritime interdiction in this new environment is cued intelligence; 65-70% of

successful cases are now based on human intelligence. We need to apply intelligence systems to sort targets from among the large amount of "background noise" and legitimate traffic in the region. We also need to apply technology to improve sensor capabilities to quickly and efficiently detect, classify, and identify suspect targets and locate hidden contraband; i.e. aircraft and surface vessel state-of-the-art radars for detection and classification, infrared and low-light sensors for identification, CINDI and IONSCAN for locating drugs in hidden compartments. Interdiction in the transit zone will also be supported by efforts to strengthen capabilities and coordination in the Puerto Rico arrival zone. Portions of the \$250 million reprogramming effort address these issues.

Transit zone interdiction is also being strengthened through regional coordination and cooperation. JIATF-East coordinates and directs as necessary the detection, monitoring, and sorting of suspect aircraft and vessels, and handoff to U.S. and foreign law enforcement authorities for apprehension. This includes multi-agency and multi-national assets. Through considerable negotiations with Caribbean countries and territories, the Coast Guard and Department of State have concluded bilateral maritime counterdrug agreements which greatly facilitate interdiction efforts by providing for ship riders, pre-approved entry into foreign territorial seas, and pre-authorized boardings. The May 15-17, 1996 United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) Regional Meeting on Drug Cooperation in the Caribbean reaffirmed the Caribbean nations' commitment to fighting drugs and developed several recommended initiatives to increase regional cooperation -- including a regional maritime interdiction agreement.

Question:

22. Is there an explanation for why the Coast Guard is being left behind in the budget request this year, by comparison to the funding offered to the Border Patrol, DEA, FBI and others, when their efforts to keep illegal drugs away from our shores are absolutely critical -- especially in the Seventh Coast Guard District, which includes 2 million square miles, Puerto Rico, Miami and the Leeward and Windward Islands of the Caribbean?

Answer:

It is incorrect to view the Coast Guard as being "left behind." The acknowledged importance of efforts to address new and emerging drug trafficking problems in the area covered by the Seventh Coast Guard District have led to several new initiatives, including the Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA and Operation Gateway. As intelligence estimates inform us, we will take the necessary steps to interdict drug flows, wherever they may be. The key to the success of our interdiction efforts is not in the size of the budget, but rather in the effectiveness and reactive strength of our intelligence-keyed efforts. This requires high levels of interagency cooperation and stresses the importance of maintaining a strong transit zone presence and flexible interdiction capability, including the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Question:

23. Can you assure us that important counter narcotics monies at the State and Defense Departments absolutely will not be reprogrammed to Bosnian police or some other international area this year, out of any of the counternarcotics funds, like the \$45 million that was reprogrammed by the President out of the drug war and into Haiti?

Answer:

ONDCP will continue to make every effort to insure that the nation's drug control programs are adequately funded. These efforts will certainly include close attention to appropriate funding for the drug budgets of the Departments of State and Defense that are key to our border and source country programs. I would also note that an additional \$250 million in funding, most targeted for programs in the international area, is being requested for FY 97. ONDCP must approve all reprogramming of drug funds in excess of \$5 million except those which are determined to present "emergencies," as was the case with Haiti. The Cabinet Counsel on Counternarcotics, recently established by the President, also provides a forum to influence all drug policy reprogramming initiatives. I am confident that ONDCP has sufficient authority and opportunity to insure that international and other drug control programs are appropriately supported.

Question:

24. As you know, Republican Leadership fought for you to get 80 new FTE's, or ONDCP staffers, on the understanding that the President would be sure you got 30 detailees from the Department of Defense. Do you have those 30 detailees?

Answer:

Pursuant to Section 101(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, The Secretary of Defense has certified to the Congress 88 counterdrug DoD detailees as being in the national security interest of the United States. This number includes the 30 additional positions requested for ONDCP.

Twenty-five of the 30 requested details to ONDCP were determined to be non-reimbursable. ONDCP is continuing discussions with the Department of Defense on the reimbursable status of the remaining 5 details requested.



Question:

25. Since October of last year, General Jose Serrano of the Colombian National Police has been awaiting replacement helicopters that the Colombian National Police lost to the drug traffickers. Whether these are SuperHueys, two-engined Hueys or Blackhawks, why have these 6 helicopters not been delivered--particularly in view of the facts that (a) he has lost 3,500 officers fighting this battle, and (b) air mobility is critical to Colombia's National Police, which remains one of the few non-corrupt institutions in that country? Would you agree that these delays are inexcusable? What will you do to get these delivered?

Answer:

These six helicopters were delivered. Part of the reason for the delay was uncertainty by the Department of State over which type of helicopter the Government of Colombia wanted. At one point in the negotiations, the Government of Colombia requested Blackhawks. Since the Department of Defense does not have enough Blackhawks to meet its requirements, their timely delivery to Colombia, as replacement helicopters for the lost UH-1H helicopters, was not possible.

Question:

26. Do you feel that a DEA ratio of domestic to foreign-stationed agents of 10 to 1 is responsive to the current window of opportunity in the source countries and the overall foreign threat posed by drugs and the drug cartels?

Answer:

Although an increase in DEA agents abroad would likely add value to our international counterdrug programs, any rapid or significant growth must be clearly thought through and planned by DEA headquarters as well as coordinated with our embassy country teams and host nation partners. DEA and ONDCP are evaluating DEA's overall program as part of the 1998 budget review process.

Question:

27. Why has DEA been unable to garner more support from ONDCP for the vetted local units that have worked so well in bringing down the Cali cartel and overcoming corruption in the source and transit countries? Can Congress play a role in strengthening support for these units?

Answer:

ONDCP, the Attorney General, and the interagency community strongly support development of vetted or special investigative units in the source countries and agree that they are an important component of our international supply reduction programs. Traditionally, special projects such as vetted units have been funded by DEA; DOJ has not requested additional funding for the vetted unit program from ONDCP.

There are a number of on-going initiatives concerning vetted units in Latin America. Establishment of vetted units is dependent upon host nation approval, is invariably a sensitive political issue within the host nation, and particular initiatives should be discussed in a classified venue. As specific proposals mature and receive host nation backing, ONDCP will work very hard to ensure appropriate funding.

ONDCP asks that Congress also support all vetted unit initiatives approved by the host nations and country teams and supported by the interagency process.

Question:

28. Has INL cut back on any DEA requests for overseas police training in recent months? If so, why?

Answer:

INL provides counternarcotics training funds to three Federal law enforcement agencies: DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard. DEA was provided with \$ 4.4 million in training funds for FY 95. They were initially provided with \$4.0 million in training funds for FY 96. Because of the significant amount of carry-over funding, INL considers this allocation to be a straight line budget.

At the end of June, INL will conduct a fiscal review of international training programs. They will assess which agencies have excess funding and which agencies may have unmet requirements. DEA overseas training requirements will be given full, positive consideration at that time.

Question:

29. Since Congress wants to be supportive of the efforts that were showing results in 1992, including use of the Customs Airwing (now effectively gone), interdiction assets and personnel (many now gone), and the source country programs (still under funded), as well as an effort to replace treatment as the top demand-reduction priority with effective prevention as a top priority, what can this Subcommittee do that will swiftly reverse the priorities being voiced at present?

Answer:

The 1996 National Drug Control Strategy is a comprehensive balanced document which lays out the priorities for national counternarcotics policy. It is critical to secure full funding for the our FY 97 counterdrug budget to implement the goals and objectives of the Strategy. I would welcome your participation in the appropriations process to secure these funds.

In the Conference Report accompanying P.L. 104-134, Congress articulated its intention to secure funding for the \$250 million initially proposed as a DoD reprogramming in FY 96 within the FY 97 budget process. Included in this initiative are key programs to bolster both source country and interdiction efforts. Funding for this initiative is widely dispersed among various House and Senate appropriations and authorization committees. I would welcome the Subcommittee's involvement in helping to secure the full \$250 million.

The House Appropriations FY97 budget for the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies funds drug treatment and prevention consistent with the FY96 budget. If this were to become law, key programs for both treatment and prevention efforts will be under-funded. If the Senate provides increased funds during its appropriations process, your participation in securing the greater budget allocation in Conference would be very helpful.

Question:

30. Can you set up a meeting between some of the key House leaders on this issue, including Hastert, Zeff, Mica, Souder, Portman, Gilman and Shaw, with the President to discuss this particular issue and the need to work hand-in-hand to re-set these priorities?

Answer:

As you know, the FY 97 budget submitted to Congress reflects the priorities outlined in the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy. The time to have a discussion with the Administration regarding counterdrug budget priorities is in preparation for the FY 98 budget. I would welcome the

opportunity to discuss the budget process, and your priorities -- as well as those of other Members -- in the Strategy development process. As required by law, ONDCP seeks input from every Member of Congress each year in the process of developing the National Drug Control Strategy.











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